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This dissertation demonstrates that the vulnerability of households to both 
socioeconomic and environmental processes is found in unequal, differentiated 
ability to access the means of social production and reproduction. Place specific 
environmental and social factors co-produce specific manifestations of vulnerability, 
but the underlying causes and driving forces are to be found in the social formation 
and social relations of households in the case study area. The major finding of this 
dissertation is that changes in the social relations of production and reproduction are 
creating as much risk to livelihoods as climate change does, or is likely to do in the 
future. Vulnerability is not necessarily caused at all by a changing climate, rather it is 
found in the daily struggles over social production and reproduction. Most so called 
‘environmental sources of vulnerability’ are not experienced equally, and their 
ultimate roots are found not in the ‘natural’ environment but in social relations. 
Household exposure and vulnerability to drought varied hugely over small distances, 
suggesting that environmental conditions do not affect all households equally. 
Vulnerabilities are experienced locally but are generated in socially scaled processes 
beyond household control. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that the vulnerability of households to both socioeconomic and 
environmental processes is found in unequal, differentiated ability to access the means of social 
production and reproduction. Place specific environmental and social factors co-produce 
specific manifestations of vulnerability, but the underlying causes and driving forces are to be 
found in the social formation and social relations of households in the case study area. The 
major finding of this dissertation is that changes in the social relations of production and 
reproduction are creating as much risk to livelihoods as climate change does, or is likely to do in 
the future. Vulnerability is not necessarily caused at all by a changing climate, rather it is found 
in the daily struggles over social production and reproduction.  
 
Vulnerability is only reduced in absolute terms when real development occurs, and the most 
vulnerable population groups in this case study are at best, only just coping with multi-scalar 
processes without the potential for real transformation to occur. Genuine vulnerability reduction 
will only occur if there are real changes in the mode of production that structures contemporary 
livelihoods, and most current attempts to identify adaptive pathways to reduce vulnerability 
within this mode of production are destined to be, at best,  ‘sticking plaster’ temporary solutions. 
At worst they serve to reinforce existing hierarchies and access to resources and livelihood 
generation strategies.  
This research began as an attempt to understand how climate change impacts on livelihoods. 
Climate change, understood as a wicked problem (Levin et al., 2012) with no simple, easy 
solutions – one that relates to many other ongoing processes. The dominant frameworks 
currently used to understand these issues are adaptation to climate change and the concept of 
resilience. These concepts, like my research, seek to understand simultaneously occurring 
socioeconomic and environmental processes. Through my doctoral studies I have increasingly 
focused on the question of what makes livelihoods vulnerable to both socioeconomic and 
environmental change This has led to a move away from concepts such as resilience and 
adaptation, which rest on ecological metaphors that downplay or ignore the social relations that 
drive exposure to climate risk and livelihoods vulnerability. This dissertation has moved away 
from consideration of climate change as a major explanatory factor of household vulnerability, 
as the interpretation of the fieldwork has indicated that the source of vulnerability is actually 
found in the struggle to produce and reproduce household livelihoods, vulnerability that is rooted 
in social relations.  
The paradigm of climate change has in some sense been ‘jumped upon’ as a means to explain 
the continuing crisis of livelihood viability in rural areas of the developing world. There has been 
a broad rejection of state-led development efforts in recent decades (Ferguson, 1990; Scott, 
1998; Smucker et al., 2015), replaced with narrower focus on poverty reduction, livelihood 
interventions and market-based reforms. Vulnerability in these contexts is understood as 
narrowly tied to income (Christiaensen and Sarris, 2007), or driven by external environmental 
factors (Mendelsohn et al, 2007). Where socioeconomic and environmental drivers of 
vulnerability are considered simultaneously, they are integrated in an additive manner, where a 
greater number of sources of risk equals a greater risk.  
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Options to increase the viability or sustainability of livelihoods are therefore understood in this 
context: increasing the amount of cash-crops that can be grown, planting of crops more suited 
to a drier or hotter climate, and access to credit and insurance for farmers in order to survive in 
a system determined by a global market logic. To a lesser extent, adaptive solutions to climate 
change have been identified as a means to reduce vulnerability. This dissertation shows that 
when we look across scales and identify the driving forces and root causes of household 
vulnerability, we find them in unequal social relations. Class differentiation and consequent 
variability of entitlements and options for social production and reproduction determine the 
options people have for adaptation to what is yet an unknown quantity. Three points are critical 
here. First, there is no acknowledgement that it is precisely the same mechanisms that drive the 
generation of vulnerability, that simultaneously enable some households to improve their 
relative wealth and resilience. Secondly, existing options to reduce vulnerability, and more 
specifically increase adaptive capacity to a changing climate, are at best mechanisms by which 
marginalized households can cope with the existing context. They contain no transformative 
potential enabling long term security (Smucker et al., 2015). Finally, many existing interventions 
are more easily accessed by those households which are already relatively more resilient 
(Holler, 2014).  
At this point it is simply not possible to tell whether households are responding in a causative 
manner to either broad climatic change or increasing climatic variability. Climate variability has 
been an aspect of livelihood vulnerability on Mt. Kilimanjaro for as long as agriculture has been 
practiced, and it appears to be getting somewhat more variable (Ahmed et al., 2011). However, 
this work argues that climate change has been jumped upon in order to make states address 
the continued uneven development of their economies and societies. It has been given far too 
much causal power as a source of vulnerability, which simply does not match up with the 
experience of household struggles to produce and reproduce livelihoods. The theory of climate 
change homogenizes rural societies as being broadly exposed to the same threats, which hides 
vast differences in their ability to cope with a wide range of risks. This, coupled with the rejection 
of meta-narratives of how development ought to occur and a retreat from state led development 
efforts, has limited the sense of what is possible with regard to societal change. It therefore over 
emphasizes environmental root causes of social differentiation and creates solutions that are 
not transformative, rather at best, they are coping strategies to maintain precarious livelihoods 
in the contemporary status quo.  
In terms of this dissertation, therefore, climate change is something that may exacerbate future 
household vulnerability, but it is not the means by which vulnerability is generated. So the 
following chapters decreasingly focus on climatic issues per se, and identify the social drivers of 
vulnerability. Climate change has been uncritically received by most scholars as an 
unequivocally transformative, determining influence on rural livelihoods. To paraphrase Harvey 
(2013), it is easier for most to imagine the apocalyptic effects of climatic shift on rural livelihoods 
than it is to imagine how capitalist social relations could be transformed to lead to a more 
equitable, less vulnerable society.  
This introductory chapter presents a synopsis of each paper, and then addresses four important 
points. First, it introduces the key theories that frame the dissertation and explains why they are 
necessary for understanding vulnerability (Pt.1). Second, it explains and justifies the structure of 
the dissertation and the importance of reading it dialectically (Pt.2). Third, it demonstrates how 
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the four articles are linked to each other, both theoretically and in practice (Pt. 3). Finally, the 
study site is described as well as some important terminology that recurs throughout the 
dissertation (Pt. 4)  
This dissertation is structured as four independent, yet closely related articles. These are 
bookended by an extensive introduction and conclusion that place the dissertation within the 
broad literature of studies of vulnerability.  
Chapter Two (Paper One)  
Paper one explores relational and dialectical methodologies, building on my reading during my 
doctoral studies. It justifies a dialectical methodology as an appropriate basis for understanding 
both vulnerability and livelihood construction. Separate from this discussion of dialectical 
methodology is an additional paper, not presented as part of this dissertation, which attempts to 
put the radical vulnerability, co-produced, into Harvey’s (2009) ‘six moments’ that would 
demonstrate a change in the mode of production.  
Chapter Three (Paper Two)  
The second paper is based broadly within the natural hazards/livelihoods studies/vulnerability 
analysis nexus. It establishes the pressing contemporary need (as desired by the IPCC WGII ) 
for indicators, methods, and understanding of the socioeconomic processes that to a large 
extent determine the vulnerability of households to environmental hazards. It combines data 
gathered from two surveys in 2007 and fieldwork in 2011. It frames the issue of vulnerability 
within the broader field of livelihoods studies and explores the usefulness of this framework. It 
explains, in detail, the long term trends and seasonal variability that cause vulnerability.  
Chapter Four (Paper Three)  
The third paper explores the issues in Paper 2 in a more relational manner. A special issue of 
Human Geography that reflected this approach to the coproduction of the environment was 
produced, and coedited by me. In the editorial to this special issue, the problem of 
understanding the production of livelihoods and land use change in the global, rural periphery 
was addressed as the complex interaction of a range of processes, driven ultimately by social 
relations. Paper three concludes with an exploration of the close relationship between different 
livelihood asset generating strategies, differentiated access to various resources and exposure 
to vulnerability, and the importance of using more relational methodologies to better understand 
livelihoods.  
Chapter Five (Paper Four)  
This dissertation begins with an exploration of dialectics as both a method and a framework for 
fieldwork. The fourth paper is written within this vein, and attempts to provide a dialectical 
understanding of how vulnerability is both understood and generated, and provides both 
theoretical and empirical examples. It demonstrates how a radical notion that places its roots 
strongly in the social relations that determine vulnerability enables climate change to be viewed 
in relation to other processes It also shows how vulnerability is not liable to be reduced without 
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transformation in the production and reproduction of daily life. Paper four can be seen as 
contributing to emerging literatures around geographies of dispossession.  
Considered together, the conclusions of the four papers provide an illustration of how household 
vulnerability to climate change must be understood within the broad political economy in which 
livelihoods are generated. It is precisely the same processes which are driving household 
vulnerability that constrain livelihood capital asset generating strategies. Most so called 
‘environmental sources of vulnerability’ are not experienced equally, and their ultimate roots are 
found not in the ‘natural’ environment but in social relations. Household exposure and 
vulnerability to drought varied hugely over small distances, suggesting that environmental 
conditions do not affect all households equally. Vulnerabilities are experienced locally but are 
generated in socially scaled processes beyond household control.  
The next section of the introduction explores the relationships between the papers.  
1. Themes in this Dissertation 
1.1 Social Relations 
This dissertation draws heavily on theoretical explanations of socioeconomic change, alongside 
empirical data, in order to explain livelihood construction and the generation of vulnerability. The 
three most important theories are those of development, agrarian change and understanding 
adaptation to climate change. These three theoretical fields are linked in this dissertation by a 
focus on social relations, which I expand upon here.  
The concept of social relations is inherently dialectical: transformation does not occur because 
objects or actors have specific causative powers, rather change occurs through the mediation, 
synthesis, resolution and negation of various factors as a consequence of their interactions. 
Although this dissertation is heavily influenced by historical materialism and political economy 
as frameworks for analysis, following Ollman (1993; 2003) and Harvey (1996; 2009; 2014) it is 
non-teleological, non-economically deterministic and does not conceive of capitalism in the case 
study area as determinant at all scales.  
Therefore in this dissertation the concept of social relations refers to the differentiated positions 
of individuals, households and places within this global system. Change occurs when these 
relations are altered. In the case study location, examples of changing social relations include 
the coming of colonial power, the shift to growing crops that are sold on global commodity 
markets, the formation and dissolution of the local coffee producers union, and the relationship 
between the local population and the national government.  
Each of the chapters approaches this critical issue of social relations in a different way. Chapter 
two goes into significant detail as to why a dialectical methodology is appropriate for exploring 
vulnerability, and why a relational approach is most appropriate. Chapter three shows the 
relationship between different capital asset generating strategies: how those households able to 
access secure work and off-farm income are much more secure than those who rely primarily 
on the natural environment to produce a livelihood. Those who are wealthy also tend to have 
greater access to social institutions, to sources of pertinent information and education and to 
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other indicators of development. Chapter four expands on these findings, and shows how 
different forms of access to, and control of assets are closely related to each other and to 
differentiated experiences of livelihood vulnerability. Environmental sources of vulnerability are 
closely related to the types of assistance and access to resources that households can call 
upon. Chapter five is written in an explicitly relational manner, and shows how these highly 
unequal social relations drive vulnerability. The dissertation concludes with an attempt to link 
social relations in the case study area with multi-scalar processes that partially determine 
vulnerability on Mt. Kilimanjaro. 
1.2 Development  
Development can be understood as both immanent and intentional (Bebbington, 2004). Most 
approaches focus on the latter, including the livelihoods framework (Scoones, 2009). This false 
binary is misleading. Precisely the same processes driving development are also driving new 
vulnerabilities. This can be illustrated by a focus on agricultural transformation. Tanzanian and 
regional priorities involve increasing earnings from agriculture. In all places where agricultural 
transformation has occurred, a minority of people benefit from expanding agricultural 
opportunities, while agriculture simultaneously becomes unviable for many rural households as 
the primary livelihood strategy. There are no contemporary examples, in sub-Saharan Africa or 
beyond, where an increasing commercialization of agriculture has led to widespread 
improvements in development indicators and a reduction in vulnerability.  
This dissertation understands development as inseparable from the uneven expansion of the 
capitalist mode of production, pace Wainwright (2008) development qua capitalism. There is 
immanence in this understanding of development, but also an acknowledgement that much 
intentional, planned development is a consequence of either marginalization of households 
within the capitalist mode of production, or their inability to engage and obtain the necessities for 
social reproduction. This dissertation also understands vulnerability as intimately related to the 
question of development; indeed it is the only means by which vulnerability can be permanently 
reduced.  
1.3 Agrarian Question  
The implications for Tanzania of the contemporary agrarian question are important for three 
major reasons. The majority of people still live in rural areas, and most of these are small-scale 
farmers. A transition is, however, occurring whereby more people are moving to urban areas 
and there is an increasing emphasis on commercial agriculture as the basis for expanded rural 
capital accumulation. Theories around the agrarian question are important for this dissertation 
because of the emphasis that is placed on rural differentiation. Peasant social formations 
transform, and may dissolve as capitalism becomes established. This is not a linear process, 
and peasantries may reform in new ways. But they are irrevocably transformed. The World 
Bank (2008) and the Tanzanian Government (2009) are actively trying to accelerate one side of 
this process through their emphasis on agricultural transformation. However, there is a willful 
ignorance about the consequences of this on households that are not capable of benefitting 
from this transformation. Perhaps more ridiculously, this “rising rural tide” is presumed to lead 
directly to overall vulnerability reduction in rural areas. Whether this occurs as capital ‘trickles 
down’ through rural areas, or because those who can’t take advantage cope by moving to other 
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(usually urban) locations is not stated. As a consequence of the increasing influence of capitalist 
relations of production, material transformations occur. Some farmers are able to expand, whilst 
others are unable to make agriculture profitable and must seek employment. Many who remain 
in rural areas will find their ability to access land or farm competitively highly reduced. This 
process is deagrarianization (Bryceson, 2002), and remains almost totally absent from the 
climate change literature. This is somewhat odd, as a small scale farmer, a commercial farmer, 
a rural laborer and someone with secure employment will all have very different vulnerabilities to 
climate change.  
Another process related to changing rural areas is deproletarianization. This idea is most closely 
associated with Tom Brass (2000, 2011b). Its principal importance for this study is the 
demonstration that rural societies can be determined by capitalist relations of production, even if 
there are still aspects of the specific social formation that are ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘peasant’. In the 
case of the case study area, it is the inability of the local economy to produce secure 
employment that enables households to mediate the vagaries of climatic variability in their 
livelihood strategies. It is not meant to indicate that at one point in the past there was steady, 
waged employment, but rather it emphasizes the constrictions that global capitalist relations 
engender when scaled down to the household or village level.  
Depastoralization is another process that has occurred on the margins of the case study area. It 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but has been demonstrated elsewhere (Smucker et al., 
2015). Again, it is of value because it shows how global processes of socioeconomic change, 
determined by capitalist logics of production and reproduction, transform the local environment 
and available household strategies. Broadly, these processes can be understood as 
geographies of dispossession in the service of expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
production. Whether understood as accumulation through dispossession or a new round of 
primitive accumulation, these processes are well documented (Harvey, 2003; Glassman, 2006; 
Fairhead et al., 2012).  
1.4 Adaptation to Climate Change.  
The question, therefore, is how to place climate change within this nexus. The concepts of 
resilience and adaptive capacity are not useful due to reliance on (metaphors of) society 
operating along ecological principles (Head, 2010; Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2011). Much work 
has focused on the question of mainstreaming adaptation to climate change research, or 
‘climate-proofing’ development. This dissertation shows that at the household level, neither 
development nor transformative adaptation is taking place at the household scale. It argues that 
for this to occur, development must occur first, then vulnerability reduction, increased resilience 
and new adaptive capacity can flow from this. Otherwise much work around climate change 
adaptation is simply redefining existing coping strategies of vulnerable households.  
This dissertation argues that a radical conception of vulnerability is the most appropriate 
approach. Climate change can’t be disentangled from existing processes, therefore 
mainstreaming it into development has become the desired goal. This returns us to the question 
of what type of development, and for whose benefit. This is the question that most climate 
change research skirts around, or simply rejects (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2011)  
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2. Method: The Dialectics of Climate and Development  
This is an attempt at a dialectical understanding of household vulnerability and the expected 
impacts of climate change. It therefore seeks to link empirical and theoretical understanding of 
vulnerability and change. The dialectic is therefore worth reinvestigating as a function for 
analysis. Chapter 2 justifies this position in detail, this introduction will spell out how it is utilized. 
This is important as it shapes both the content of the dissertation, explains why so much focus 
is given to social relations, and also why the dissertation is structured the way it is.  
Smith (2009) argued that much of what became known as the postmodern turn in geography 
and the broader social sciences was not a rejection of dialectics per se, rather an overly 
structural, determining and closed dialectic most associated with Levi-Strauss. In terms of this 
research, the principal outcome is the rejection of broad based, state led development efforts as 
both a desired and achievable outcome. For many, the state has become the antithesis to the 
viability of rural households (Scott, 2009; Smucker et al., 2015)  
This insight is important as it shows both the value and the limitations of a dialectical approach. 
This dissertation is in complete agreement with the notion that contemporary and historical 
conditions can’t be extrapolated from the structural machinations that ultimately determine them. 
Rather, social activity should be understood as being co-produced through the dialectical 
interaction of the historical (and geographical) context of a place and the structures that 
determine social differentiation, and in this dissertation, vulnerability.  
The conceptualization of dialectics used in this dissertation derives from Marx, through Harvey 
and Ollman. A dialectical approach underpins virtually all of Marx’s work, but is not a rigid 
framework. Famously, it demonstrates how “Men make their own history, but not in 
circumstances of their own choosing” (Marx, 1852). This understanding of the interaction 
between historical and structural processes is the basis for this dissertation’s structure. The 
Chagga on Kilimanjaro became a group, transformed their social formation and experience 
differentiated household vulnerability as a consequence of the interplay between these different 
forces.  
Marx begins Capital Vol. 1 with a study of the commodity. Although the work is dedicated to 
unveiling the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production, he begins with a very empirical 
description of the material conditions in which people live. Only later in the book does he begin 
to identify fetishized processes such as use value and exchange value, the labor theory of 
value, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, class formation and the relationship between 
organic and variable capital costs. This dissertation attempts to dialectically explore vulnerability 
on Mt. Kilimanjaro in a similar way. Following a justification of dialectics, two major empirical 
case studies are presented. The last two chapters of the dissertation then abstract back into 
theory from these concrete findings, highlighting the structural processes driving vulnerability 
and exploring their implications for the study of adaptation to climate change.  
Harvey (1996) explicitly engages with dialectics and like Ollman (1993) identifies an open 
dialectic shaped by a theory of internal relations, in which everything is to some extent is related 
to everything else, determined in the last instance by capitalist social relations. This is the 
position this dissertation takes. A dialectical approach enables a range of socioeconomic and 
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environmental processes to be considered in relation to each other, whilst still acknowledging 
that they do not all flow from the moment of production in a capitalist system. This is especially 
true for social formations that remain on the margins of the global capitalist mode of production.  
 
3. Contribution to Theory  
The chapters that comprise the dissertation are closely related, all approaching the 
coproduction of vulnerability and livelihoods but from different perspectives. Theoretical and 
empirical linkages can be made across the chapters: presented dialectically, they are the 
synthesis of both the specific context and the abstract structures that together produce and 
determine differentiated household vulnerability. The challenge to environmentally deterministic 
narratives, and the naturalization of vulnerability that occurs as a consequence, is one example 
of a unifying theme that links the papers together.  
This dissertation has moved beyond a narrow focus on climate change  because of a deep 
reluctance to embrace an environmentally deterministic understanding of the driving forces of 
vulnerability, and more broadly rural differentiation and social transformation. These ideas are 
often latently present in much of the research surrounding resilience and adaptation to climate 
change, as well as narrow definitions of climatic vulnerability. The major consequence of these 
explanations is that they naturalize the causes of vulnerability, removing them from the social 
relations where the real determinants are found.  
However, there is still the issue of incorporating real environmental limits into a study of 
vulnerability that is resolutely focused on the previously mentioned social relations. Rainfall, the 
area of land suitable for coffee planting, and changes in population are all factors that must not 
be ignored in shaping livelihood possibilities. Chapters three and four highlight examples of 
these very real environmental limits, however the conclusion (chapter six) makes the argument 
that these limits are disproportionately important precisely because the majority of households 
are unable to jump scales and take advantage of new opportunities.  
This dissertation exemplifies this in both theory and practice. In theory, it draws upon the 
production of nature thesis (Smith and O’Keefe, 1980; Smith, 2009). The relationship between 
people and societies under capitalism is understood as one of production: very few land 
surfaces globally remain that are not used for some combination of use value and exchange 
value. At the scale of both the household and the region, the broad movement is increasing the 
profitability and surplus value generated from agricultural activities.  
Although many livelihood activities do not operate under capitalist principles per se, they are 
fundamentally dominant and determinant over a range of scales in the case study area. This 
point is returned to in detail in the conclusion, for now it is sufficient to say that households are 
still impacted upon by relics of the previous pre-capitalist modes of production that existed on 
Kilimanjaro.  
In practice, the dissertation places these environmental limits in relation to vulnerability and 
livelihoods in chapters three, four and five. Chapter three identifies the environmental 
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constraints of the livelihood strategies used by households, as well as the broad geographic 
limits on expanding these. Chapter four demonstrates how access to the natural resources 
needed for social production and reproduction are closely related to household access to stable 
forms of off- farm income, or flows of remittances or income from outside the region.  
In the last instance, production of the environment for social production and reproduction is 
determined by the relative class position of the livelihoods of individuals or households. 
Regardless of existing climatic variability or projected future change, opportunities to produce an 
agricultural surplus are dependent on access to land, water, farming inputs, credit or capital to 
invest, educational levels, political capital, access to secure employment elsewhere and 
remitted inflows of money, all of which are socially mediated and determined.  
 
4. Case Study Location 
 
The purpose of this section is to give a broad overview of the case study area, and some of the 
key terms that are used throughout the dissertation. The dissertation is composed of articles, 
which have space constraints .I have therefore used this section to explain several Kiswahili 
phrases that crop up throughout the dissertation. They can be understood as direct translations 
if no additional context is provided.  
The research all took place in Kilimanjaro region, Tanzania. The fieldwork in 2011 was 
conducted in Rombo District, one of six districts in Kilimanjaro Region. Two villages were 
selected, Ubaa Kati and Ngoyoni, with different socioeconomic and environmental 
characteristics. Broad socioeconomic differences between the villages occurred because one of 
them , Ubaa Kati, was much closer to the administrative center of the District in Rombo Mkuu. 
This meant there were greater opportunities for waged work that was not subject to the vagaries 
of the environment. However, differentiation of vulnerability within the villages was much more 
pronounced than between them. Environmentally, the major difference was that Ngoyoni was 
further down the mountain and was therefore hotter and drier. Because the village boundaries 
broadly reflect the historical settlement patterns of independent clans, and then the Chagga on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro, they tend to be elongated rectangles running down the mountain. Historically, 
boundaries between different clans, and latterly villages, were based on ravines and streams 
that ran down the mountain.  
 
Each village is comprised of several ‘sub-villages’, and attempts were made to survey in all of 
the sub-villages that made up Ubaa Kati and Ngoyoni. An administrative level of ‘ward’ exists 
between village and district level. Therefore the administrative hierarchy in the region closely 
correlated to these demarcations. Each sub-village has a council of elders, who would have 
significant decision making power at the hyper-local scale. At the village scale, there is also a 
council, which has power over the sub-villages. At all scales the power relationship is broadly 
top-down. Problem identification and prioritization of development needs might be identified at 
the village level, but it is delivered in the context of decisions made in Dodoma (the Tanzanian 




The Chagga are the dominant population group in Kilimanjaro Region, especially in the rural 
areas, accounting for almost 90% of people (NBS, 2002). Formed from existing agriculturalists 
on the mountain, their group construction and identity occurred during the articulation with 
colonial rulers (Shivji, 2009). The ‘typical’ Chagga household residence also has a ‘kihamba’, or 
homegarden. This is where, historically, coffee and bananas, as well as other vegetables and 
sometimes livestock are kept. Increasingly, maize is also grown here. These plots of land tend 
to be smaller than two hectares, and the crops grown here are best suited to areas further up 
Mt. Kilimanjaro where rainfall is higher and temperatures are cooler. Households often have 
access to land further down the mountain, which is known as ‘shamba’ land. Maize, groundnuts 
and sunflowers are amongst the crops typically grown here. Fodder is also produced for 
animals, which are kept at the kihamba in ‘zero-grazing’ conditions.  This dissertation also refers 
to ‘kibarua’ labor at points, which refers to casualized, non-permanent, often seasonal work. A 
major example of this is working on larger or more productive coffee producing households at 
harvest time, or on some of the larger coffee plantations that exist on the mountain. 
 
5. Dissertation structure and summary 
This dissertation will proceed as follows. The next chapter is a theoretical framing of a dialectical 
methodology in the context of climate change (Chapter 2), followed by two largely empirical 
presentations of fieldwork findings, data and case study specific knowledge relating to 
vulnerability and livelihoods (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). The final substantial chapter (Chapter 5) 
is an attempt to present dialectically the theories and findings that have been introduced and 
explored previously. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by integrating the findings into 
broader literatures of agrarian change and transformation, and identifies the fundamental 
importance of placing social relations centrally in the study of climate change, and outlines 





Chapter 2: Climate Change and People Change: Dancing the Dialectic.  
 
Abstract.  
The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) 
says there is accelerated climate change because of enhanced release of greenhouse gases. It 
is projected for East Africa that temperatures will increase but there is no agreement on the how 
precipitation will change. There is acceptance that the weather system will throw up more 
frequent extreme conditions, including drought. The question of how we can begin to 
understand how this will materialize in people’s livelihood strategies and adaptive choices is 
critical. This paper identifies theoretical problems in the dominant discourses surrounding 
human-environment relations and climate change, and argues for a dialectical approach to the 
subject. It concludes with a brief vignette of what a dialectical study of climate change ought to 
focus on. 
Change, transition, movement, articulation. 
Tanzania is part of a global capitalist system. It has a disarticulated pre-capitalist mode of 
production (Shivji, 2009) in which a differentiated peasantry is subject to extra-economic force 
that is characterized by Harvey (2003), following Luxemburg (1913), as accumulation by 
dispossession.  The differentiation of the peasantry is essentially twofold namely those who 
have access to a second farm (50 per cent) and those who have significant off-farm 
employment opportunities (50 per cent).  For more detailed discussion see the other papers in 
this dissertation. This essential disarticulation occurs because wage levels are “bachelor wages” 
(Shivji, 2009), i.e. paying only for the subsistence cost of the labor not sufficient to cover the 
cost of the social reproduction of labor. Peasant labor super-exploits itself in multiple 
occupations and by cutting down on necessary consumption (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). As a 
consequence, there is no accumulation of surplus value in the process of agricultural 
production, no expanded reproduction of capital, so there is little industrial investment, which in 
turn, would modernize agriculture. Dispossession produces disarticulation. That is about to 
change as the state seeks multinational partners for large scale mono-cropping. Only 10 per 
cent of land is under permanent cultivation (Coulson, 2013) so the changes in the mode and 





How can the climate change and people collision be analyzed? 
Observing the world, no matter what part or aspect, involves categorization and prioritization of 
certain factors. On a philosophical level, it is necessary to ask what role these factors play in 
determining the direction of change, and what is the relationship between the parts. The 
conventional approach is to study each part in depth, in order to explore its role as a driving 
force in relation to other factors, to isolate one aspect and try and understand it as if other forces 
were not acting it on continuously. This is the entry point at which a dialectical conception of the 
world offers a clear alternative. 
Ollman (1998) uses the analogy of Humpty Dumpty – you can understand and know all the 
individual pieces of the broken eggshell, but without a sense of how they relate to each other it 
is nigh on impossible to accurately describe the ‘whole’ they should resemble when 
reconstituted. Dialectics, potentially, offers an outline of the world that can consequently inform 
and shape the research methodologies that are needed to explore change at a local scale. It 
also provides a means by which to link processes occurring on a range of scales.  
Perhaps the most successful geographic work to be rooted in a dialectical methodology is that 
of Uneven Development by Neil Smith (2009). Identifying the specific means by which society, 
within the capitalist mode of production, produces both nature and space required a dialectical 
form of argument that, following Marx, identified and shone light on the contradictions inherent 
in this mode of production. In particular, the process by which capitalism expands is through the 
contradictory, yet simultaneous, processes of differentiation and equalization. These terms can 
in themselves be understood dialectically and provide a much more coherent base on which to 
structure notions of change than any positivist position has provided. 
The dialectical method was central to the modus operandi of Marx. It is unsurprising that the 
most significant engagement with, and utilization of, dialectics within geography has come from 
Marxist geographers. David Harvey is arguably the most prominent theoretician in the historical-
geographical materialist paradigm. His specific reading of Marx and Marxist literature, with 
particular regard given to the dialectical methodology, has enabled a range of new theoretical 
conceptualizations to be developed. Prominent amongst these are the Spatio-temporal Fix, 
Accumulation through Dispossession and Uneven Geographical Development (Harvey 1982, 
2003, 2006). These processes have been demonstrated to exist within, and on the periphery of, 
the capitalist system. This, at the very least, shows the potential to utilize dialectics as a 
methodology. There is, however, no single dialectic methodology.  
Castree (1996) identifies a range of divergent and opposing strands within research that has 
had a dialectical basis. In particular, he traces a path through the multitude of different 
conceptions of dialectics David Harvey has made in his work. He identifies Harvey’s dialectic as 
not being influenced by two significant strands of post-Marx Marxism – that of Althusserian 
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structuralism and that of analytical dialectics. Rather, the importance of Hegel, and particularly 
Marx are emphasized. This particular reading means that the criticisms leveled at structuralism 
and analytical Marxism are not likely to weaken Harvey’s style of dialectic significantly (Castree, 
1996). Rather, Harvey’s dialectic is predominantly ‘systemic/epistemological’ (Castree, 1996, 
p.343). They not only explain and diagnose the issues they are seeking to explore, but also 
place dialectics as the most appropriate means for knowing about the world. Harvey should be 
judged on this in his in-depth, place based research rather than the internal logical consistency 
of the dialectic as a method 
Harvey’s most explicit laying out of a dialectical methodology is contained in his 2009 article. 
Harvey expands on a footnote in Marx to reveal the forces that explain social change. This 
article is fundamentally important because it enables a framework to be developed in which 
relationships between different processes are taken as a given, and exploration can take place 
within the whole of societal relations. He identifies six moments in which change can occur that 
can fundamentally alter how other relations manifest. By Harvey’s (2009) formulation, change 
will have really occurred until it is registered at each of the six moments. Focusing just on one 
moment, as many studies do, will miss change in many ecological problems, how they are 
problematized, and how they should be related to the dominant form of social organization 
(capitalism) that exists. He identifies technology, the relation to nature, forms of production, 
social relations, social reproduction and mental conceptions of the world. The key point is that 
real change has not occurred, and a transition to capitalism is therefore not complete until 
change registers in each of these moments. It therefore provides a non-deterministic framework 
that enables socioeconomic, cultural and environmental issues to be considered simultaneously 
and in relation to each other. The final part of this paper returns to this framework in order to 
highlight its relevancy. 
Operationalizing the Dialectic. 
In the livelihoods approach (Scoones, 1998), a method that has come to dominate much 
fieldwork in developing countries, the natural capital of a household is the natural resources that 
it can command in order to achieve social reproduction and production. In the first instance, it is 
the capital most impacted upon by climate change. Disregarding questions about what is 
‘natural’, this can be seen to be of huge importance to those societies who still largely rely on 
small scale, often subsistence agriculture.  
It is apparent that this concept could be considered within Harvey’s framework, but it is not quite 
as simple as saying the relation to nature equates to the category of natural capital in the 
framework.  Basing the framework in the production of nature, it is possible to begin to explore 
the relationships between these different moments of articulation. For example, the link between 
social relations and the relation to nature is a starting point for investigating how access to 
resources is decided, enforced and limited. This can go further to explore what is to be 
exploited, who decides, and on whose terms these decisions are made. The relation between 
the relation to nature and the reproduction of daily life must be considered. Or, looked at 
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another way, how much of what is grown on the farm is used for household subsistence? How 
much of household subsistence and reproduction relies on producing from nature? What other 
inputs are required for household production? When these factors change, how does the 
relationship to nature change? For example, if there is more reliance on off farm income/cash 
crops then how is biodiversity affected? The relational questions go on and on. 
Why should dialectics be preferred as a method as opposed to other conceptualizations to 
frame research? Two issues arise - the first concerns the appropriateness of using the ‘scientific 
method’ as the basis for social science research, and specifically the utilization of systems 
theory as a means to understand complex, coupled, social-natural relations, and the limits to 
positivism. The second is the necessity of a ‘dialectical dance’.  
The Limits of Positivism 
Positivist approaches are derived from theories developed in the natural sciences.  The 
underlying principle is that an objective reality, separated from the researcher, exists and can be 
understood through suitable exploratory methods (Laws et al., 2003). It is axiomatic within the 
social sciences (bar economics and psychology) that the scientific method cannot be 
extrapolated untouched into the realm of social theory and research. The conscious 
subjectivities and unpredictable aspects of society have meant the idea of a unifying theory, 
mathematically based, does not exist to explain human behavior. However, this does not mean 
that positivist methodologies are absent from social science; indeed, much research around the 
subjects of development, adaptation to climate change and livelihoods in the developing world is 
still structured essentially within a positivist research paradigm.  
The purpose of this dissertation research in Kilimanjaro Region is to understand vulnerability. A 
large study was recently undertaken on Mt. Kilimanjaro to observe vulnerability (Christiaensen 
and Sarris 2007); household data was collected, and analyzed through income generation from 
crops (whether they grow coffee or not) and explored the benefits that insurance could provide 
for the farmers. The underlying question was whether insurance, an adaptation strategy, would 
make them more likely to invest time and effort in growing for export.  
The remit of the study was somewhat circumscribed the methodology, but here vulnerability was 
defined simply as the likelihood of being poorer at some point in the future. It is nothing more 
than a tautology to say people are vulnerable because they are poor, and they are poor 
because they are vulnerable. It is also indicative of the limits of what can be achieved within a 
positivist framework-vulnerability, a highly debated and contested term, has now been assigned 
a universal ‘scientific’ definition. This a priori assumption means the legitimacy of this research 
depends on the notion of vulnerability being as uncontested as that of ‘gravity’ or ‘soil’. If it 
doesn’t hold up, then the tenuous strands linking the research together will certainly begin to 
unravel.    
Quantitative methods have long being preferred in positivist research, as they contain the ability 
to generalize and extrapolate results from the studied sample to the wider population. National 
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and international institutions often regard these quantitative methods as more reliable and 
worthy of response (White, 2002). The focus on quantifiable data may consequentially negate 
the exploration of factors that are harder to quantify. Chambers (1994) argued that this focus 
restricts what is defined as reality and prohibits plural explanations of what is important. 
 One means by which positivist frameworks have dealt with these critiques is to incorporate 
qualitative research methods. The strengths of these are that they enable a plural range of 
views to be considered and may even contradict findings generated by other qualitative 
methodologies (Sarantakos, 2005). Grounded in an acute awareness of the strengths and 
limitations of each field of inquiry, the utilization of both quantitative and qualitative methods can 
potentially provide a basis for affirmation, triangulation and enhanced reliability of research 
findings. Poorly chosen, overt or unintentional application of either quantitative or qualitative 
methods is argued to lead to low quality research as a consequence (White, 2002). 
Consequentially, the ‘cutting edge’ of high quality research in this paradigm is that which can 
incorporate a range of methods, within a positivist methodology.  
A framework designed to explore these process is the notion of double exposure. It is structured 
in a way that gives prominence to the interaction of multiple processes, and the consequences 
that result. It does this through the identification of three different pathways through which 
‘double exposure’ can manifest. These are outcome, context and feedback (Leichenko and 
O’Brien, 2008). What is important to note here is the design of the framework, which is rooted in 
systems theory, perhaps the most successful attempt by people researching in the positivist 
paradigm to model complexity. The growth of systems theory has led to the claim that because 
scientists are now engaging with complexity through these means, dialectics is redundant which 
Levins rejects (Levins, 1998).  
Systems theory and dialectics have a starting point that is of fundamental importance for 
anyone studying complex human-environment relations – the complexity and web of 
interrelations are taken as the starting point. In systems theory, relationships and processes are 
understood as feedback loops and outcomes (Levins, 1998). The concern with process is 
something that is central to both a dialectical and systems theory approach. The reason why 
systems theory is reductionist is that it cannot account for historical contingency and cannot 
truly deal with the concept of interpenetration as opposed to just interaction. The mathematical 
nature of the modeling that is the crux of systems theory also privileges the collection of 
quantitative data as the basis for observations and prediction – here the same limitations that 
apply to all quantitative data collection in social science apply.  
The Necessary Dialectic Dance 
Social constructionist epistemologies assert that an external reality, whilst existing, cannot be 
understood objectively by researchers (Sarantakos, 2005). This is the antithesis to the orthodox 
positivist thesis. Knowledge is not gained solely through sensory observation but mediated and 
created by powerful institutions and interests, and the interaction of society with the natural, 
physical world is what generates meaning (Sarantakos, 2005).  
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The reasons why dialectical investigations have been dismissed by the ‘academy’ in general are 
multi-faceted, and often have more to do with perceived implications of what dialectics represent 
than what they actually purport to do. The role of the Cold War, Stalin’s reductionist conception 
of dialectical materialism, the move away from Marxism as a consequence of the horrors of the 
Gulag have all enabled dialectics to be dismissed as the intellectual basis of a tried and failed 
system of social organization.  
The search for the essential basis of social change has also been a reason why dialectics has 
not being as widely utilized as it could have been. Dialectics, as previously shown, is most often 
associated with Marxist modes of analysis; consequentially, and understandably, the motive 
force of societal change has been identified as the mode and relations of production. Harvey‘s 
work (2009) plays such an important role – it bases itself solely in Marx’s methodology and yet 
comes to the conclusion that the mode of production cannot be held to be determinant as the 
focus and locus of change – change must be registered in a range of moments for it to be 
conceived of as real. Ultimately, the strength of dialectics as a method of analysis can be 
summarized by recourse to Marx; his utilization of this methodology was the first time in which 
capitalism was ever accurately described as an abstract system (Castree, 1996; Harvey, 1996; 
Ollman, 2003).  
To conclude this discussion we return to Harvey (2009). Specifically, a brief illustration from my 
fieldwork, of production, social reproduction and environmental change, is presented 
dialectically.  
In the Kilimanjaro region, as elsewhere, production is dominated by small holder agriculture. All 
coffee goes to market, through an auction in Moshi. Control of the quality, and therefore local 
price, deteriorated as the Union lost control of the supply chain and a series of middle buyers 
sought to harvest by farm, encouraging farmers to sell early at lower quality. Since the 1970s, 
the price has substantially declined, particularly if inflation is factored in. But the coffee market is 
essentially global, dominated by Brazil and with Vietnam now a significant competitor against 
East African production. Within the Chagga households, coffee as the cash crop is largely under 
male control. 
The critical issue is that the Chagga gardens are small scale production, centered on a single 
household.  Because of extended family relationships, the simplest definition of household is 
people who eat from the same pot. The strategy of such households is one of risk minimizing 
rather than product maximization.  Risk minimizing is essentially one based on husbanding 
existing resources rather trying produce a new nature. Such a strategy is successful precisely 
because it is a social model of production, with risks and responsibilities within and to the 
community and obligations beyond the individual household. Because they are risk averse, with 
little savings, they are reluctant to innovate in case the innovations jeopardize production and 
reproduction opportunities. 
With the exception of bananas, little other agricultural produce contributed to household income. 
Coffee (15 per cent) bananas (28 per cent) remittances from working away (17 per cent) and 
local off-farm income opportunities (26 per cent) made up the average household income 
suggesting that off-farm opportunity matched on-farm income in contribution (Authors fieldwork, 
206 household survey in Kilimanjaro region). 
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Based upon observations from the field, the size of garden appeared to be correlated with 
external income and with educational level. Those farming larger plots, especially further up the 
mountain tended t speak English well, an indicator of secondary education, and have had 
access to financial capital enabling them to expand cultivation (Author’s field notes). Educational 
level  correlated with access to formal agricultural advice services: the more educated a 
household head, the more likely that they had contact with extension officers and knowledge of 
current ideas of best practice. Access to agricultural advice services correlated with willingness 
to innovate on the farm.  
In short, a relatively privileged elite, who are simultaneously amongst the least vulnerable of 
households, does exist. This differentiation is based significantly on both income and access to 
education. 
Just over 50 per cent of the Chagga garden farmers have access to shambas. Little production 
was for sale from the shambas. There had been a shift from lower value carbohydrates, 
especially sorghum, to improved drought resistant maize but that, when successful, was largely 
for home consumption. Small protein crops, such as cowpeas, were grown but again for home 
consumption. The shambas looked poorly maintained and served as an agricultural safety net 
for some, rather than a production opportunity under peasant production systems (Authors 
fieldwork, 206 household survey in Kilimanjaro region). 
Under colonial rule, German and later British authorities, imposed essentially a poll or hut tax 
(Coulson, 2014). This was one means by which classically understood peasant social 
formations are transformed and articulate with the capitalist mode of production. Other coercive 
methods included the use of forced labor (Potts, 2006). The broad effect was a necessity for 
households to engage in the pursuit of exchange value for the sake of social reproduction. No 
Independent Tanzanian government could go down that route. De facto, however, the same 
thing has happened after independence because social reproduction activities became formal 
exchange values rather than use values. School fee expenditure falls twice yearly and health 
expenditure is  burdensome across June and July, not because of an increase in disease 
burden, but because of cash flow problems before harvest. Essentially, the transition from 
peasantry to paid labor/product is because the government will not pick up costs associated 
with social reproduction. While Chagga households complain of these costs, government does 
not have revenues from a subsistence agricultural economy to underpin social reproduction. 
The cost of social reproduction can only be bought by government if it uses state ownership to 
move from communal, customary law to individual, statutory law. In short, privatization. This is a 
debate which resonates in and beyond Tanzania. (Manji, 2006; Shivji, 2006; Shivji, 2009). 
The Chagga cannot go up the mountain for the forest line marks the start of the international 
land use of trekking, costing each tourist US$ 50 per day just for being there. In addition this 
area is a National Park although, during fieldwork, there were reports of over 5,000 squatters 
evicted from the park. The Chagga cannot go down the mountain because, beyond the existing 
shambas, the government does not currently contemplate any land redistribution. In short, they 
are squeezed between two parallel restrictions of nature. 
In the gardens, the two constraints of nature are altitude and aspect. In general, the richer and 
most productive farmers sit midway up the profiles facing southeast towards the monsoon 
bearing rains. This seems most advantageous in the long rains as the short rains have less 
directionality. Individual households possess their gardens as permanent usufruct under 
	  
18	  
traditional, communal law. Tree cover provides for substantial nutrient recycling. Zero grazing 
on the garden, especially of cows, gives additional inputs. 
In contrast, accessing nature on the shambas is increasingly contested. As herders, the Maasai 
have disappeared from the region. Their original disappearance was generated by the Ujaama 
policy of turning pastoral area into arid and semiarid agriculture. Originally, the distribution of 
land, all of it owned by the government, was on the basis of need. That was, however, 50 years 
ago. The same families have the same shamba arguing, at local level, just like their gardens, 
they possess them under traditional, communal law. There is little surplus vegetation or animal 
residue to replenish nutrients and the sandy nature of the soil means water retention is very 
poor giving field crops a sense of permanent drought. In these conditions perhaps maize was 
not the most appropriate crop for the shamba.    
What has to be admired is the originality of the Chagga three dimensional, multistory, 
multipurpose agroforestry system, one of the most productive in Africa. What has disappeared, 
however, is the reciprocal exchange entitlements with the Maasai -, tree products for meat and 
milk. Nature produced in one social formation can die in another. 
Conclusion 
This paper has identified dialectical methodology as being critical to understanding the wide 
range of forces that shape livelihoods, and the importance of the capitalist mode of production in 
shaping how people reproduce their livelihoods, their environments and their ideas about the 
world. Somewhat removed from the orthodoxy of adaptation to climate change and vulnerability 
studies, it is argued here that there is no more suitable epistemological and methodological 
framing of the study of socioeconomic and environmental change. 
Dialectics is an inherently relational framework, but it is also directional. This is an important 
difference. The direction is not predetermined or predestined, and a dialectical methodology 
ought not to be teleological if it is to be of use. An appropriate analogy with physics would be the 
difference between speed and velocity: social relations, like speed involve movement. 
Dialectics, like velocity, involve movement in a particular direction. In the final instance, the 
relations of production and social reproduction under a capitalist mode of production define a 
range of opportunities or constraints available to households in the Kilimanjaro Region of 
Tanzania.  
This paper has not explored how mental conceptions of the world are changed through 
transforming social relations. Wisner (2015) has identified how farmers reproduce top-down, 
unidirectional ideas of how climate change will affect their livelihoods, even though the material 
evidence of their existence from this research suggests a much more dynamic situation. This is 
the direction that genuinely radical conceptualizations of political economy, political ecology, 








This paper explores how livelihoods and vulnerability are constructed on Mt. Kilimanjaro, 
Tanzania. The methodological framework for the research is the livelihoods approach of 
Scoones (1998), and expanded upon by DfID (1999, 2000). The paper finds that both 
vulnerability and capital assets are differentiated geographically, and that those who are most 
vulnerable tend to rely to a greater extent on sources of natural capital. Social capital, which 
was historically a strong force for both reducing vulnerability and enabling a degree of 
redistribution, is weakening as the importance of off-farm sources of income, including 
remittances, becomes more significant. Limited geographically, sustainable reproduction of 
Chagga society, especially in the context of already existing climatic variability and potential 
future climatic change, requires a level of support for rural households that acknowledges the 
inequities and increased vulnerability caused by greater integration and exposure to global 
market forces, and the important role played by households in maintaining high levels of 
biodiversity in the case study location.   
Introduction 
This article presents the results of fieldwork conducted in Kilimanjaro Region, Tanzania 
exploring the related concepts of vulnerability and livelihoods. This article addresses the context 
in which capitals are generated on Mt. Kilimanjaro. It will be necessary to explore the factors 
that cause and enhance vulnerability, especially with regard to climatic change and variability, in 
the region. It is based on research carried out in Moshi Rural and Rombo Districts of Kilimanjaro 
Region. Figure 3.2 shows the research location. 
Literature Review 
This paper uses the livelihoods approach to explore the context of, and relationship between, 
vulnerability and livelihoods on Mt. Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. This approach is taken because 
sources of vulnerability and the means by which livelihoods are constructed are explicitly linked 
in the framework. It draws on a definition of vulnerability drawn from the natural hazards 
paradigm, emphasizing the range of environmental and social sources. These are placed in 










Figure 3.1: Livelihoods framework 
 
(Scoones, 1998) 
The livelihoods framework defines vulnerability as being composed of shocks, trends and 
seasonality. Shocks that increase the vulnerability of affected populations are short term, rapid 
onset events (DFID, 2000). In Kilimanjaro Region, these will potentially include drought, 
flooding, hunger and food insecurity. Long term trends in natural and socio-economic processes 
can alter the vulnerability of societies. In the context of this research these may include 
enhanced climatic change, climatic variability, increased impacts of El Nino Southern Oscillation 
events, and a decline in prices received for commodities such as coffee. Variation in availability 
of assets, entitlements, opportunities and requirements throughout the year corresponds with 
differentiation of vulnerability on a household and collective level (DFID, 1999). Most of the 
information regarding seasonal vulnerability in the case study location was obtained through the 
production of a seasonality calendar, which formed part of the supplementary survey. The 
seasonality calendar enabled exploration of the pressures on livelihoods and how this varies 
throughout the year. 
 
The framework in which the analysis of vulnerability is located is that of the livelihoods 
approach. This paper explores the differentiation of vulnerability through assessing households’ 
capacity to respond and adapt to actual and predicted hazards that constrain livelihood 
construction option (Scoones, 1998; DFID, 2000; Wisner et al., 2004). Identifying the range of 
capital assets produced and commanded by households enables association between particular 
livelihood strategies and variation in exposure to natural and socio-economic hazards.  
Research Methods 
The principal framework and methodology is the livelihoods approach. This framework enables 
a range of quantitative and qualitative research methods to be incorporated. Although a 
dichotomy has been thought to exist between the application of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, recent research, particularly with regard to livelihood studies, has emphasized 
the possibility and benefits of combining a range of approaches. However, it is imperative to 
remain aware of the limitations and appropriate usage of each particular research method 
(DFID, 1999; Ellis, 1998; Ellis and Mdoe, 2004; Carvalho, 1997). 
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The project adopted a mixed methods approach in order to both collect and analyze a range of 
quantitative and qualitative data. Seven different research methods formed the basis of the 
project. These methods, and the information obtained from them, are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Research Methods  
Method Information Obtained 
Primary 
Survey  
Quantitative data regarding personal information, agricultural methods, income and 
expenditure, response to drought, perceptions of climate change and livelihood 
construction –1089 households were surveyed 
Secondary 
Survey 
Quantitative and qualitative data regarding access to institutions and social networks, 
sources of assistance in difficult times, importance of coffee in capital generation, 




Provided the context for findings obtained in fieldwork; provided specific statistics that 








Provided the researcher with an indication of how livelihoods were constructed in the 
case study location, and how this varied between profiles and altitude 
Transect 
Walks 
Provided the researcher with an indication of how livelihoods were constructed in the 
case study location, and how this varied  
Secondary 
Data 




The research took place in Kilimanjaro Region, Tanzania. The household surveys were 
completed in two districts of Kilimanjaro region, Moshi Rural and Rombo. A small number of 
surveys were also carried out in Old Moshi, and these are referred to occasionally in this paper. 
A transect was surveyed at each location, beginning very close to the National Park boundary 
and ending in the foothills of the mountain. These locations are shown in Figure 3.3. The 
secondary surveys and transect walks took place in the same areas. Upon returning to Rombo 
District in 2011 for further fieldwork, conversations were held with 35 farming households in 
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order to explore whether there had been any significant changes in the region that would 
invalidate or question the findings from the 2007 study. 




The study was based around collection of approximately eleven hundred household surveys, 








Figure 3.3: Transect Locations  
 






Following Adger (1999), vulnerability can be differentiated between collective and household 
levels. As the livelihoods approach focuses on household level capital generation, the focus on 
vulnerability will be on the same scale. This differentiation is related to, but not commensurate 
with, the distinction made by Wisner et al. (2004) with regard to root causes, dynamic pressures 
and unsafe conditions in their PAR model of vulnerability. The possibility of intra-household 
vulnerability is noted, but is not within the scope of this research (Wisner et al., 2004).  
Drought is probably the most serious natural hazard that affects the livelihoods of people in 
Kilimanjaro Region.  Seventy two per cent of respondents stated that drought had a great 
impact on their agricultural productivity; fifty nine per cent claimed that it had a great impact on 
their health and thirty two per cent perceived it as having a great impact on availability of energy 
sources. When asked to identify the last time a drought affected the area they reside in, a wide 
variation of years was recorded, indicating that the effects can be very localized; following 
Wijkman and Timberlake (1984), drought may simply be an instance of not been able to access 
enough water to sustain a particular livelihood option. However, some particularly large scale 
droughts were identified. Table 3.2 shows these findings. 
Table 3.2 Last Drought Experienced in Kilimanjaro Region 
Year of Drought Number of Respondents 
identifying it as last drought 
% of Respondents identifying it as 
last drought 
1974 19 2 
1984 151 15 
1994 34 3 
2003 51 5 
2004 103 10 
2005 296 29 
2006 47 5 
No Drought 212 21 
 
 (Primary Survey Data) 
As the survey was designed to identify the last time a drought affected an area it was not 
possible to ascertain the relative seriousness of each drought year. The phrasing of the 
question also explains why a majority of responses are since the turn of the millennium. Twenty 
one per cent of respondents stated that they had never been affected by drought; this suggests 
that access to different water sources can compensate for a reduction in rainfall in a given year, 
and also supports the contestation that the effects of drought can be extremely localized. A 
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pattern also emerges in which major droughts appear to recur on a decadal basis; 1974, 1984, 
1994 and 2004-5 account for fifty nine per cent of responses.  
A drought in this research was considered serious when it impacted significantly on production 
and consumption of food. Fifty one per cent of respondents claimed that very little was 
harvested during a drought year, and twenty two per cent stated that nothing was harvested at 
all. Although reduced, or late-onset of, seasonal rains were stated as a drought indicator by 
sixty seven per cent of participants, the impacts were perceived primarily as a reduction in 
available food. Eighty two per cent of people regarded food shortages as the main impact of 
drought, whereas only four per cent considered water shortage the primary effect. Sixty eight 
per cent of people said that the effects of drought were an increased requirement in agricultural 
labor, probably because of attempts to produce a different crop. 
Increased variability of precipitation may be a more significant issue affecting adaptation of 
household livelihood strategies in the region than absolute change in either levels of 
precipitation or temperature. Figure 3.4 and 3.5, which detail the variability of rainfall, during the 
long rains, in Rombo District highlands and lowlands, Kilimanjaro Region, from 1995-2006, 
indicate the challenge of agricultural production in an uncertain climate.  
Figure 3.4: 
 Rainfall Variability in Rombo District Highlands 1995-2006 
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Figure 3.5: Rainfall Variability in Rombo District Lowlands 1995-2006 
 
(Rombo District Office) 
The population in Kilimanjaro Region has grown significantly since Tanzanian independence. 
The effects of this process have mainly been perceived by local people as a scarcity of available 
land; seventy per cent of households complain about the shortage of suitable areas, which is 
the second highest level of displeasure recorded in the country (URT, 2006). Table 3.3 details 
population change in the case study area. 
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Forty six per cent of respondents stated that their farming methods had altered in the preceding 
five years. Of those who had changed their methods, sixty eight per cent identified a change in 
the climate as the primary factor; also significant was soil exhaustion, which was the reason for 
change for nineteen per cent of households. 
Variation in availability of assets, entitlements, opportunities and requirements throughout the 
year corresponds with differentiation of vulnerability on a household and collective level (DFID, 
1999). Most of the information regarding seasonal vulnerability in the case study location was 
obtained through the production of a seasonality calendar, which formed part of the secondary 
survey. Seventy two seasonality calendars were completed by individual households. The 
secondary survey took place in the same locations as the primary data collection, but the 
households visited varied. The main findings are detailed in Table 3.4, and are summarized in 
Table 3.5. In Table 3.4, yellow indicates a problem for up to a third of the households surveyed, 
brown is something that affects between one third and two thirds of households and red 




















Table 3.4 Results from seasonality calendar 
Activity Activity detail J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Social Reproduction Paying School Fees             
Social Reproduction Healthcare costs             
Resource Access Difficulty Collecting Firewood             
Resource Access Difficulty in obtaining sufficient Water             
Cultivation of garden             
Cultivation of shamba             
Planting of garden             
Planting of shamba             
Weeding of garden             
Weeding of shamba             
Pest Management For Coffee             
Pest Management For Beans             
Pest Management For Maize 
            
Harvesting Of Coffee             
Harvesting Of Beans             
Harvesting Of Bananas 
            
Harvesting Of crops from shamba             
Processing Of Coffee             
Processing Of crops from shamba 
            
Marketing Of Coffee             
Marketing Of Beans             
Marketing Of Bananas             
Marketing Of crops from shamba             
Off-farm work When off-farm employment sought 





Table 3.5: Summary of seasonal vulnerability 
Issue Findings 
School Fees January and July are when this expenditure is required; no 
variation between highlands and lowlands  
Difficulty obtaining 
fuelwood 
Hardest to obtain during long rains (April) and short rains 
(November/December); 85-90% of respondents in lowlands 
had difficulty obtaining fuelwood at these times, much lower 
percentage in the highlands 
Difficulty obtaining water In upper zone August and September most difficult times; in 
lower zone at least three quarters of respondents have 
difficulty obtaining water between July and October 
Marketing Coffee Coffee primarily marketed in July and August; more people 
marketing coffee in the highlands than the lowlands 
Marketing Bananas In the highlands marketing of bananas occurs throughout the 
year; greatest amount is marketed in May. In the lowlands less 
people produce bananas for market and in January, 




August was the month when most work was sought in the 
highest reaches of the highlands; in the lowlands most 




At the household level, human capital is a function of knowledge, health, the quality and quantity 
of available labor, and livelihood relevant skills (DFID, 2000). The percentage of respondents 
who had received at least primary education was seventy eight per cent.  As many of the survey 
respondents finished their education a long time ago, the current level of ninety per cent 
enrolment in primary education is indicative of progress towards the second MDG, achievement 
of universal primary education.  Fourteen per cent of female respondents, as opposed to five 
per cent of male respondents, stated that they had received no formal education; in 2005 it was 
estimated that twelve per cent of males and fifteen per cent of females in Kilimanjaro Region 
had never attended school.  Fifteen per cent of respondents had received at least a secondary 
education, compared with the current level of seventeen per cent enrolment in Kilimanjaro 
Region in 2004-5. Access to education is also differentiated by location, altitude and income.     
Respondents were asked to identify which disease most frequently impacts on their household. 
Malaria can be identified as the primary disease that affects people in Kilimanjaro Region, with 
forty six per cent of respondents stating that is the major health risk. Thirty six per cent of people 
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identified coughs or chest pains as the major problem; this could either be an indication of 
people who spend a large degree of time in smoke filled kitchens or a possible symptom of a 
disease such as tuberculosis. Ninety seven per cent of households said they had not been 
affected by any serious disease outbreaks in the preceding three years, suggesting that when 
problems do occur they are localized and have the greatest effect within the household, 
although the cumulative effect on levels of human capital may be significant. 
From the total sample, twenty nine per cent of participants indicated that their primary source of 
healthcare was a district dispensary or hospital. Sixty seven per cent relied primarily on private 
dispensaries or hospitals. Only one per cent of respondents claimed that they never sought out 
healthcare. When the results are disaggregated by different areas of the research location 
significant differentiation of healthcare source emerge. The greatest accessibility of government 
supported hospitals and dispensaries are found in the three areas that are located in Moshi 
Rural District. These are Old Moshi, Marangu and Moshi Rural lowlands (thirty nine per cent, 
sixty per cent and seventy one per cent respectively). In the three areas of Rombo District the 
figure does not rise above eight per cent. Several potential reasons may assist in explanation. 
The most prosaic is one of different perceptions of respondents - Huruma hospital in Rombo 
District is operated by a religious group and therefore perceived as a private institution. 
However, it receives much of its funding from the Tanzanian government, so could be 
considered commensurate to institutions in Moshi Rural District. This factor alone does not 
explain the large discrepancies between regions, as much healthcare advice and product is 
obtained from dispensaries as opposed to hospitals. In Moshi Rural District many of these are 
free at the point of use, provided by the government. The same situation does not exist on a 
large scale in Rombo District, perhaps because of its relative isolation from Moshi town.    
The majority of survey respondents (seventy seven per cent) perceive themselves primarily as 
farmers. It is therefore probable that the means by which people obtain information about 
improved farming methods and other relevant details is indicative of varying levels of human 
capital on Mt. Kilimanjaro. The principal sources of farming information are agricultural 
extension officers (thirty three per cent) and other farmers (thirty per cent). Other sources 
included seed merchants (five per cent) and the media (four per cent). The percentage that has 
access to extension workers is comparable with Soini (2005), who stated that sixty nine per cent 
of farmers had no contact with them.  Twenty nine per cent of households claimed that they did 
not have any external sources of information regarding agricultural practices. The pattern of 
access to formal sources of agricultural information can be differentiated by several factors; 
education as a variable is explored as an example. 
The importance of education in enabling access to formal sources of agricultural knowledge is 
apparent. Those survey respondents who had received at least a secondary education had a 
forty four per cent contact rate with the extension service; this rose to fifty per cent for those with 
a tertiary education. People with no education had a reduced opportunity of contact (twenty 
three per cent); the undertaking of adult learning also did not appear to be significant with only 
twenty per cent of respondents in this category stating access. Above average reliance on other 
farmers for information is noted in those respondents with no schooling, adult and primary 
education. The use of seed merchants increases from zero for those with no education to 
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eighteen per cent of people with tertiary instruction. Forty five per cent of respondents with no 
education have no access to external information sources; this figure drops to twenty eight per 
cent of primary schooled people and twenty one per cent of those with secondary education. An 
inverse relationship would appear to exist between level of education and access to formal 
external sources of information; a relationship also exists between a lack of education and a 
lack of external information. This suggests that various indicators of human capital can reinforce 
each other, with positive or negative consequences.  
The level of biodiversity in Kilimanjaro Region is substantial; the forest and grassland areas 
above the level of the national park boundary contain many species that are endemic to the 
location. Since initial cultivation of the homegarden system began over a century ago, the 
Chagga have identified and retained trees, grasses and plants which serve a practical purpose 
whilst removing those with minimal utility (Fernandes, 1984).  
The range of biodiversity prevalent in a typical Chagga homegarden is evidenced in Fernandes 
(1984), where over sixty types of plant and tree species, with a huge range of end-uses, are 
identified. It can therefore be stated that the Chagga have traditionally practiced agroforestry 
methods, even if that description would not have been utilized historically. Ninety two percent of 
survey respondents perceive themselves as practicing forms of agroforestry, suggesting that 
households are aware of the importance of all species on their plots, as opposed to only the 
food and cash crops produced.  Recent research in Rombo District by Munishi (2007) has 
identified seventy four different tree species in the middle zone of the area, suggesting an even 
greater level of biodiversity than that identified by Fernandes (1984).   
Statistics obtained from the household survey indicate the important role that natural capital has 
in the construction of livelihoods on Mt. Kilimanjaro; however, there are also results that suggest 
the natural resource base is limited by a number of factors. Eighty five per cent of homegardens 
were smaller than two hectares; this compares with the average total area cultivated by a 
household of 1.74 hectares suggested by Soini (2005). Fifty three per cent of households 
cultivated another plot on the lowland separate to their homegarden, which is slightly greater 
than the forty two percent recorded by Soini (2005). Planting in different ecological zones 
requires a greater range of knowledge than cultivating in one area only, and is also indicative of 
higher levels of natural capital available to households that have this option. 
For ninety seven per cent of households fuelwood is the primary source of energy for cooking 
and lighting. This indicates a considerable reliance on sources of natural resources, and time 
taken to collect these products can significantly impact on time available for other productive, 
and potentially income generating, activities. The secondary survey provided information 
regarding time taken to collect fuelwood; thirty seven per cent took less than thirty minutes, 
twenty seven per cent took up to an hour, fifteen per cent took between one and two hours and 
sixteen per cent took longer than two hours. 
Physical capital is a function of the existing infrastructure, which may be freely or nominally 
accessible to households in the location, and the implements available for assistance with 
livelihood construction. It is therefore necessary to consider both the existing infrastructure and 
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the generation and variation of household physical capital, and how this varies by a range of 
factors (DFID, 2000). 
Infrastructure that is generally accessible to all the population in the case study area includes 
the road network. Resources that may necessitate payment for usage include water, machinery 
to assist agricultural production, particular forms of energy consumption and educational 
establishments. As the survey was focused on the primary source of energy, it was not possible 
to determine how many households had access to electricity; however, the figures from 1994 of 
six per cent of households supplied in Moshi Rural District, and two per cent in Rombo District, 
are not likely to have altered significantly (NBS, 2002). Results from the secondary survey 
indicated that thirty seven per cent of households could potentially access electricity if 
necessary, suggesting that even its availability does not necessitate a great uptake amongst 
those who could potentially utilize it. 
Household differentiation of physical capital can be observed through variation of building 
material, roofing material, farm size, possession of items that may increase agricultural 
productivity, and means of transporting produce to market. Historically, a stone house was a key 
indicator of wealth in Chagga society (Soini, 2005). In that survey of forty five households,  sixty 
per cent were constructed of stone and forty per cent were based on a mud-brick design. The 
secondary survey provided information regarding the type of building materials used. Table 3.6 
details these findings. Reasons for the discrepancy between the findings and those of Soini 
(2005) are probably to do with the wider range of locations on Mt. Kilimanjaro in this study. 
Table 3.6 Type of Building Material for Main Residence 
Type of Building Material # of respondents % of respondents 
Stone/Block 50 42 
Mudbrick 61 51 
Wood/Poles 7 6 
 
(Secondary Survey Data) 
Access to a reliable source of water is indicative of relatively high levels of physical capital. 
Responses from the household survey suggest that over ninety per cent of people have access 
to piped water for domestic use; fifty seven per cent of respondents had piped water on their 
own farm and thirty three per cent had access to a neighbor’s pipe. The secondary survey 
confirmed this, with forty seven per cent of respondents with access to piped water in their own 
household. Three per cent relied on publicly accessible water pipes and seven per cent 
obtained their requirements from wells, rivers or streams. The secondary survey indicated that 
sixty one per cent of households took less than fifteen minutes to obtain their water supplies, 
twenty per cent took up to half an hour and six per cent required up to an hour. Three per cent 
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of households took between one and two hours and three per cent took longer than two hours to 
obtain sufficient water. 
In the context of the livelihoods approach financial capital refers to both flows and stocks. As 
development activities rarely distribute financial aid directly to households, it is necessary to 
explore indirect ways of enhancing this capital asset; it is unlikely that recommendations of 
directly enhancing the financial capital of the most vulnerable households are likely to be 
countenanced by those responsible for distribution (DFID, 2000). 
In 2006, income generation in the study area came primarily from coffee (six per cent), bananas 
(thirteen per cent), milk sales (seven per cent), livestock sales (eight per cent), remittances 
(fourteen per cent) and off-farm sources of income (forty three per cent). The mean income 
amongst households surveyed was TSH 370544/-; the median income was TSH 178000/-. The 
average mean income in Moshi Rural District is more than twice the level of Rombo District. The 
comparison between the two districts identifies the importance of off-farm income in livelihood 
construction, and the significantly higher levels obtainable for households in Moshi Rural. 
Respondents in Rombo district relied significantly more on farm production for income 
generation. 
Cattle are the most financially valuable form of livestock kept in Kilimanjaro region. If fed well, 
there is potential to earn income through the sale of milk; if they need to be sold the price 
received is approximately TSH 200,000/- per head. Fifty per cent of households surveyed did 
not own any cattle, and twenty three per cent possessed one. Twenty seven per cent of 
households owned two or more cattle. Thirteen per cent of households had borrowed at least 
one cow from another source, but these are less valuable financial assets, as the right to sell 
does not exist for the recipient in this relationship.  
The major difficulty cited by respondents with regard to selling produce was low prices; fifty six 
per cent identified this as the principal problem when marketing their crops. Twenty eight per 
cent of respondents stated that they did not sell any agricultural produce. Seven percent of 
respondents had no problem with selling output. Only two per cent identified transport issues as 
the primary constriction on selling; this suggests that improvements in existing infrastructure 
may not have as beneficial an effect as hoped.  
As off-farm income has been shown to be a significant part of financial capital generation, it is 
necessary to further explore the various methods through which households obtain this. The 
main sources of off-farm income identified by respondents are businesses, waged labor and 
remittances. Business was the main source of off-farm income for thirty two per cent of 
respondents, and can take many forms such as running a small shop, providing transport or 
marketing services to other farmers and production of baskets and other handicrafts. Waged 
labor is the primary source for twenty nine per cent of households; the major problem with this 
form of income generation is that the peak demand for labor in the area is likely to coincide with 
maximum labor requirements on the household farm. For nineteen per cent of households 
surveyed remittances are the most important source of off-farm income; if these are reliable 
they can assist in financial requirements throughout the year, but this may not always be the 
case (Primary Survey). 
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Formal and informal networks, groups and institutions are the defining characteristics of social 
capital in this research. Formal social institutions and institutions include agricultural extension 
practices, government and NGO assistance during times of drought or hunger, membership of 
cooperative organizations, access to commercial seed and other input merchants, and active 
political involvement. Informal institutions comprise the practice of borrowing livestock from 
wealthier farmers and other customary redistributive measures, informal lending arrangements 
between friends and relatives, remittances received and reliance on informal networks during 
times of stress (DFID, 1999). Although it can be difficult to identify useful indicators of social 
capital several possibilities have been identified from the primary and secondary surveys. These 
are not exhaustive but provide an indication of both formal and informal networks that exist in 
the region, and an attempt to assess the strength of them.  
Twenty eight per cent of respondents stated that they received remittances in 2005; this rose to 
thirty per cent in 2006. The amount received varied from zero to TSH 4.5 million/-. In 2006 
remittances accounted for fourteen per cent of the total income stated by respondents across 
the study site. This varied significantly between the two districts studied; in Moshi Rural forty two 
per cent of participants claimed to receive remittances compared with only nineteen percent of 
households in Rombo.   
In times of need it can be easier to assess the existence of informal ‘safety nets’ that enable a 
degree of food security to be achieved that not be accomplished by individual households 
(Adger, 1999). In the survey, response was differentiated into who provided the assistance and 
what type of assistance was received. Thirty six per cent of respondents identified relatives or 
neighbors as the primary source of assistance, twenty nine per cent stated assistance from 
central government, eleven per cent relied on local level formal assistance and one per cent 
received help from NGO’s.  
Historically livestock was transferred from wealthier to poorer farmers. These redistributive 
measures were associated with cultural disapproval of ostentatious displays of wealth (Howard 
and Millard, 1997). This informal mechanism provided a mutually beneficial scenario; the richer 
farmers could distribute some of their wealth whilst still retaining a level of power over their 
poorer neighbors, and the poorer farmers were entitled to some of the livestock produce, and 
sometimes offspring. It is therefore an indicator of desirable social capital. Thirteen per cent of 
households possessed cattle that belonged to other people, ten per cent had borrowed at least 
one goat and five per cent had a minimum of one sheep that they did not own; for other animals 
the figures are less than two per cent. As this process of animal transfer was historically very 
important (Moore, 1986), and has not been replaced by a formalized equivalent, it is possible to 
infer that this indicator suggests that social capital is under pressure.  
Membership of formal organizations indicates a level of institutionalized social capital. The 
secondary survey explored the level of participation in various groups. Table 3.7 states the 
responses. A level of formal membership exists across the region, but twenty four per cent of 
respondents were not involved with any groups, suggesting potential for enhancing participation 




Table 3.7 Membership of Formal Organizations 
Organization # involved with 
it 





Cooperative 10 19 
NGO 0 0 
CBO 12 22 
Other 12 22 
None 13 24 
(Secondary Survey Data) 
Discussion 
A review of relevant secondary literature on the case study location has identified a range of 
livelihood diversification options that require consideration (Scoones, 1998; Ellis, 2004; Soini, 
2005). Examples of these include intensification or expansion of agricultural methods, and 
increased reliance on off-farm income. The potential for these methods to be used by 
households will now be assessed. 
In the higher and middle zones of the Chagga homegardens potential for intensification is 
limited by several factors; primarily the unfeasibility of mechanizing production on steep slopes 
and the difficulty in obtaining chemical inputs, either through unavailability of credit to purchase 
or removal of previously  subsidized supply. Other intensification options include indigenous 
forms of terracing, use of improved seeds, increased application of manure and compost, 
cultivation of higher value agroforestry species and higher yielding livestock varieties (Soini, 
2005). Although potential for improvement exists in all these areas, there is a significant caveat 
which must be considered. Mdoe and Wiggins (1997) touch on this issue when discussing 
smallholder dairying on Mt. Kilimanjaro. With the absence of many direct subsidies for 
households, the burden of risk in any intensification process is placed almost entirely on the 
farmer. They discuss this problem in the context of intensifying dairy production, but the problem 
is equally important with regard to other opportunities for intensification. When the inherently 
variable climate of Mt. Kilimanjaro is factored in, the risk burden is probably unsustainable and 
outweighs the potential benefits; provision of formal support networks, for both inputs and as a 
form of safety net if the intensification process founders, are required if this option is to be 
pursued.     
The potential for expansion of the Chagga farming system is constrained by a number of 
factors. The upper limit of the homegarden system is the Kilimanjaro National Park. Although 
there is the presence of a ‘half-mile strip’, that is jointly controlled and managed by local and 
national authorities, the possibility for clearance and settlement on higher altitudes does not 
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exist. At the lower reaches of the system, what was described as savannah two decades ago 
(Fernandes et al., 1984; Moore, 1986) is now almost entirely under cultivation. This is either in 
the form of lowland farms that are usually a mixture of maize, sunflower and beans, or an 
attempt to replicate the Chagga homegarden system on less watered and fertile land further 
down the slopes. The former method has existed longer historically, and is based around crops 
that are perhaps more suited to this agro-ecological zone. The latter technique, as 
demonstrated by the poor quality of banana plants and other crops when compared with higher 
up the slope, makes it unlikely that livelihoods can be sustained in these areas by on-farm 
activities alone. The lack of available land on the mountain, and the difficulty of accessing plots 
that may be a significant distance away from the homestead, suggests that opportunities for 
expansion of the system are severely constrained. 
Off-farm income has been shown to be the most significant aspect of income generation with 
regard to livelihood construction on Mt. Kilimanjaro. Due to the previously described restrictions 
on increasing on-farm production, it is therefore pertinent to explore potential to expand the off-
farm income of households in the study area. Off-farm income can be categorized into 
temporary, seasonal or permanent migration for work.  It can occur on a local, regional or 
national scale. Significant local sources of off-farm income include work related to tourism on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro, particularly in Marangu in Moshi Rural District, and laboring on other farms. This 
association with the tourist trade is the primary reason for the difference in average income 
between Moshi Rural and Rombo districts. These options are restricted geographically and 
temporally. Regional and national migration, to Moshi, Arusha and Dar es Salaam, provides a 
greater income earning potential.  The relatively high educational attainment of people in 
Kilimanjaro Region in comparison with other parts of Tanzania indicates that potential exists for 
quality, salaried work if migration is considered as a livelihood option. The relatively high quality 
of much of the housing observed, and the relatively high levels of remittances recorded, suggest 
that much wealth generated elsewhere is transferred back to this region. However, increasing 
reliance on off-farm income can have significant consequences for on-farm production. The 
most apparent is the reduction of available labor on the farm, although if off-farm income is 
sufficient then labor can be hired. As those who migrate tend to be the most active members of 
a family, those left on the homegarden are likely to be the elderly or young, who may not 
possess the physical condition or knowledge to cultivate as successfully as possible. The 
reduction in time spent undertaking agricultural activities can reduce knowledge of the 
techniques required to maintain the complex homegardens. Consequentially, the cumulative 
effect of these actions could be a reduction in the biodiversity and biomass of the area could 
occur, which may then affect the water availability and supply on the mountain. 
The research has identified the important factors related to generation of each type of capital 
asset. It is necessary to explore the inter-relationships between different capitals, as enhancing 
one could be detrimental to the other assets. Possibilities for enhancing capital assets are 
considered, along with a discussion of possible consequences for other capitals. 
Human capital is relatively high in Kilimanjaro Region, especially when compared with other 
parts of Tanzania. Primary school enrollment is amongst the highest in the country, and virtually 
everyone has access to healthcare, although the quality and availability of this varies 
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significantly. Potential opportunities for human capital enhancement exist in increasing the 
amount of people who obtain at least a secondary education, and in concurrence with Soini 
(2005), improving access towards, and quality of, the extension service. Constraints include 
financing an expansion of both secondary education and the extension service.  
The level of natural capital in the case study location has been shown to be high, and 
particularly important in the livelihood construction of those households that do not have access 
to significant sources of off-farm income. As the levels of biodiversity and biomass in the 
Chagga homegardens play an important, if not defined role in the water management system on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro and its foothills, the possibility of payment for ecological services should be 
investigated further. A potential method for financing this would be through an international 
facility such as the Clean Development Mechanism. The major constraints for enhancing natural 
capital in the area are the previously discussed restrictions on intensifying and extensifying the 
homegarden farming system, and sourcing sustainable funding for the concept of payment for 
ecological services. 
The quality and quantity of physical capital, particularly infrastructure, varies markedly between 
districts in the case study area. Although there are relatively high levels of infrastructure when 
compared with other parts of Tanzania, the areas with greater stated income generally had 
greater levels of infrastructure. This was observable for public assets such as roads as well as 
personal assets such as private water pipes. A process which will be completed within three 
years in Rombo District, to tarmac the road to the Kenyan border, is the greatest opportunity 
observed for enhancing physical capital. The primary constraint to expanding physical assets 
elsewhere is the high initial and ongoing expenditure. Individual indicators of physical capital are 
likely to increase as a result of increases in other capitals, particularly financial capital (Soini, 
2005). 
Over half of financial capital generation on Mt. Kilimanjaro is made up of off-farm income 
sources including remittances. Therefore, a focus on opportunities to increase the level of off-
farm income, particularly for those households in Rombo District, is a potential pathway to 
enhancing financial capital. An example of how this could be achieved is through the promotion 
and support of local businesses. There is potential for increasing on-farm production, 
particularly with regard to adding value to primary produce, and increasing output and hence 
financial returns, through intensification of agricultural and agroforestry activities. 
Commensurate to all these goals is the possibility of expanding various forms of micro-finance 
and micro-credit schemes, which are currently accessible by a small minority of households. 
Constraints are the high level of investment required when instigating these schemes and the 
increased burden of risk placed on households if appropriate safety nets are not also enacted. 
 Social capital, particularly in the form of informal networks, appears to have declined in 
importance from the pre-colonial era (cf Moore, 1986; Howard and Millard, 1997). Those 
households in the lowlands that may be considered most vulnerable to the effects of drought 
rely more on formal government support in times of need than the relatively wealthier 
respondents further up the mountain. They are more vulnerable to drought not only because it is 
on average drier in this part of the area, but also because they are less able to pursue livelihood 
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strategies that would enable a reduction in this vulnerability. Opportunities for enhancing social 
capital, as the livelihoods framework understands it, are likely to be greatest in supporting and 
funding local NGO’s, CBO’s and formalizing local institutions. An example of this is the work 
Envirocare, a Tanzanian NGO, is doing with women’s groups in Kilimanjaro Region. Collective 
action can provide the individual members with greater income generating opportunities, with 
regard to both on-farm and off-farm capitals generating activities. Ensuring sustainable funding, 
the initial capital requirements to create these groups and problems with ensuring equal access 
are the main constraints to enhancing social capital. 
Increasing the quantity of individual capital assets can affect the level of other capitals. This can 
occur in a positive manner; an increase in human capital can provide information on best 
practice farming techniques, therefore enhancing levels of natural and financial capital. An 
increase in physical capital could provide better access to markets and more reliable sources of 
water, with positive effects for levels of financial and human capital. Increasing social capital 
might improve dissemination of best practice, provide access to appropriate tools and 
strengthen the position of producers; this can potentially increase levels of human, physical and 
financial capital. However, the process can work in the opposite direction. Enhancing human 
capital may persuade people that improved livelihood options exist away from the homestead, 
with subsequent negative effects on natural capital. Increasing financial capital through 
additional sources of off-farm income can reduce the quantity of natural capital through neglect 
of the farm. It can also affect human capital through a reduction in location specific agricultural 
knowledge and negatively influence social capital because of a lack of previously shared 
common interests between households. Therefore any interventions need to be carefully 
considered for all potential consequences.  
Conclusion 
 
This research has established two main findings. The first is that vulnerability on Mt. Kilimanjaro 
is highly differentiated, and is experienced primarily by households dependent on the natural 
environment for their livelihoods. The second is that households that can possess high levels of 
some capitals also tend to possess high levels of others. This section explores the implications 
of these two findings. 
The research has identified the capital assets that enable livelihood construction on Mount 
Kilimanjaro. The importance of various capitals has been considered, alongside the variation 
within different districts in Kilimanjaro Region. Potential opportunities and constraints with 
regard to capital enhancement have been explored. With this information collated, it is 
necessary to consider the potential for the Chagga society to adapt to climatic change in the 
case study location. 
When considering adaptation options it is important to differentiate between genuine adaptive 
measures and an expansion in coping mechanisms that are already prevalent in Kilimanjaro 
Region. Following Adger (1996), coping mechanisms occur within existing institutional and 
power arrangements, whereas adaptation often involves modification of the structures in which 
the transformation of livelihood takes place. As the most vulnerable groups who have been 
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identified through the research process are generally those with relatively low levels of capital 
assets, and also affected more by shocks, trends and seasonal factors, they would presumably 
be the people who would benefit most from successful adaptation measures. The livelihoods 
framework is an excellent set of methods for describing these processes, but it is severely 
lacking when it comes to explaining why these households remain vulnerable and how they can 
become more resilient. The argument made in this conclusion is that it is precisely because of 
the way questions of ‘political capital’ and power and conceptualized within the framework that 
they cannot be understood as driving forces of vulnerability. This builds upon criticisms made of 
the livelihoods framework by Collinson (2002), and acknowledged by Scones (2009). 
The fundamental weakness of the livelihoods approach for understanding household 
vulnerability is that it only indicates the possibilities and limitations of expanding existing coping 
mechanisms. There is no mechanism by which transformation in livelihood options is possible, 
except for being negatively affected by external sources of vulnerability. The evidence this 
paper has presented has indicated that in fact these sources of vulnerability are not external, 
but rather found in household struggles to secure livelihoods. This vulnerability is highly varied 
amongst households, and closely related to the capital assets they are able to command. The 
most vulnerable households are those with a significant tolerance on their natural capital, and 
an inability to generate or access other capital assets. They also have the least ability to access 
social networks, and transform institutions in their own interest.  
Without this ability to access and change institutional structures that have a bearing on their 
own livelihood construction, adaptation remains a concept that can only be imposed through 
top-down, external structures. Successfully enhancing the adaptive capacity of the most 
vulnerable is essentially a process that requires understanding of the socio-economic and 
political conditions that create vulnerability, and attempts to identify pathways through which 
adaptation can be realized. Potential focus should be on enhancing the resilience of vulnerable 
societies, through disaster risk reduction and capacity building approaches. This could enable a 
level of preparedness and response to biophysical hazards that is currently not achievable, and 
possibly achieve a more appropriate entitlement to livelihood. The livelihoods approach enables 
identification of the most vulnerable, and those with the lowest levels of capital assets to draw 
upon for social reproduction and production. Attempts to reduce vulnerability, enhance 
resilience, adaptive capacity and the level of different capital assets households can command 
must therefore by necessity draw upon a sense of social and environmental justice, and accept 
that some form of redistribution alongside increased production at the household level is a vital 









Livelihoods in Tanzania are constructed through a diverse range of practices. This paper draws 
on the Livelihoods Approach alongside the 'double exposure' framework in order to explore how 
households on Mount Kilimanjaro construct their livelihoods, and are constrained by the local 
and wider political economy. Specifically, it uses these frameworks in order to explore how 
people may in future adapt to an increasingly changing climate. Most households in the case 
study region are found to be highly reliant on the natural base of the area, and are liable to be 
highly vulnerable to future climate change. Means by which households can reduce vulnerability 
are explored, and the most feasible are found to be those that involve a reduction in reliance on 
direct production from nature. The paper concludes with a discussion of the appropriateness of 
the research framework, and argues that a dialectical approach may enable more appropriate 
questions to be posed and engaged with. 
  
Introduction 
This paper is based on research that sought to explore how rural societies, however defined, 
might attempt to adapt to project future climatic shifts, and consequently how this may affect the 
ability of these people to sustainably (re)produce their livelihood strategies with regard to 
constraints and diversification. The livelihoods model of Scoones (1998) was utilized; it 
contained a framework for the research methodology through which the socio-economic and 
environmental sources of vulnerability, the natural and social basis of livelihood construction, 
and the institutions, structures and processes that mediate and differentiate the relationship 
between them could be explored. This livelihoods approach is important because it is the basis 
of much current thinking in development theory and practice – and it is commensurate with a 
broad political ecology framework, and draws heavily on many of the same concepts in order to 
explore society-nature interactions. The research was also heavily informed by the ‘double 
exposure’ conceptualization (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000) and the Wisner et al. (2004) notion 
of vulnerability and how it is constructed. 
This paper introduces two critical theoretical concepts into a framework for exploring how 
livelihoods are created. The intention is to explore how these theories of rural transformation 
can be linked to the livelihoods framework by focusing on the relationships between different 
factors of livelihood construction. Throughout this paper the assumption is that social relations 
determine vulnerability to a large degree, an idea expanded upon in chapter five. Conventional 
analyses of livelihoods are limited when it comes to understanding the dynamics of how change 
occurs. Insights that can be gained from this approach include identification of a range of 
potential exogenous sources of vulnerability, and identification and classification of a range of 
productive/reproductive measures and things and classify them as a type of capital. Then, 
because of the classical economism of the framework, and the livelihoods model in general, it is 
assumed that by raising the marginal productivity of one capital asset can lead to a more 
	  
41	  
sustainable productive system. However, relations of power and political access, amongst many 
other processes, negate the usefulness of the livelihoods approach. Although the livelihoods 
approach framed the study, it has been possible to return to the data obtained and, with the 
benefit of a new critical framework, examine what it established but also what it misses out. 
 
The basis for this critique is two fold. The first is an attempt to expand and explore the limits of 
the explanatory power of livelihoods approaches, following Scoones (2009). The livelihoods 
framework also intends to explore linkages within livelihood construction, particularly with regard 
to the formal and informal institutions that ‘transform’ structures and processes (DFID, 1999). 
However, the contention of this paper is that the framework, which focuses on the identification 
of tangible capital assets and specific shocks that can threaten livelihood variability, is not 
relational enough. Secondly, this is an attempt to use field data to explain Harvey’s (2009) 
article, on change in the mode of production. He expands on the conception of a critical 
historiography of technology making it possible to reveal the forces that explain and are 
indicative of social organization. This article is fundamentally important because it enables a 
framework to be developed in which relationships between different processes are taken as a 
given, and exploration can take place within the whole of societal relations.. This paper has 
explored just three of the ‘moments’ described by Harvey – and this has been enough to render 
the livelihoods approach problematic. It is unable to determine what drives change using both 
the livelihoods framework and the conceptualization of climate change as a single thing. By 
Harvey’s (2009) formulation, change will have really occurred until it is registered at each of the 
six moments. Focusing just on one moment, as this research originally intended to do 
(environmental change, specifically climate change), will miss change in other factors (such as 
relations of production). As explained in chapter two, positivist models of change can also not 
comprehend that the root of ecological problems, and how they are problematized, is the 
dominant form of social organization (capitalism) that exists.  
Returning to the issue of adaptation to climate change, it will be shown that the use of the 
livelihoods approach framed in this context can only see climate change as an external threat 
that causes vulnerability. The double exposure framework struggles to overcome this and 
results in a binary view, if not a tautology, where increased exposure to environmental risks may 
make someone more vulnerable to socio-economic process, and vice versa. The wider point for 
adaptation to climate change is that change is not likely to fundamentally lead to societal 
transformation, if change is conceived as needing to register in all of Harvey’s six moments, 
unless it causes changes in all six moments. Therefore, it is impossible to say that climate 
change has the potential to fundamentally alter social organization unless the potential for 
transformation is first identified, and then manifested, in Harvey’s six moments. 
Impacts of climate change likely to affect those in sub-Saharan Africa more than most, due to 
their socio-economic standing and commensurate vulnerability. Those for whom agricultural 
production is a primary form of subsistence activity are at particular risk in terms of the vagaries 
of the climate because of the nature of their relationship to nature. However, the impact of any 
change will be mediated by a whole other range of factors that affect the basis of reproduction 
of livelihood choices available to people. Specifically, the feasibility or profitability of small scale 
agriculture, alternative employment opportunities both within and external to the household 
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location, the role of wider trends in affecting livelihood choices and how natural hazards and 
processes interact with these factors.  
Therefore, investigation of how people try and attempt to adapt to the impacts of potential 
climate change is both necessary and potentially informative to other facets of development 
theory. As projected impacts are not yet on an appropriately small scale, and must always be 
treated as what they are (predictions, not predetermined preordained outcomes), then a proxy 
for how people may adapt to future climatic change is sought. That proxy is adaptation of 
livelihood strategies in response to climatic variability. This is justified on the assumption that a 
rural population, or peasantry, that can adapt successfully to the vagaries of an unpredictable 
climate on a recurring basis is better placed to withstand any future effects of Climate Change 
than a social group who cannot. The rhetoric of adaptation is commensurate with that of 
reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience in the natural hazards paradigm. Successful 
adaptation should be sustainable; therefore livelihood choices that engender a greater degree of 
sustainability are more resilient and less vulnerable.  
Construction of livelihoods in geographic locations that experience great climatic variability 
predominantly involves a range of different strategies to enable social reproduction. The 
purpose of the research was to establish how people had responded to climatic variability in the 
past, how this vulnerability of was differentiated amongst households with a range of capital 
asset generating strategies in the case study area. It was found, as hypothesized, that those 
who were most vulnerable to the effects of climatic variability were those that relied primarily on 
agriculture for subsistence production, in contrast to the relatively less vulnerable whose 
available livelihood strategies did not rely primarily on the vagaries of the climate. Households 
that could access a diverse range of livelihood options, and had relatively good access to the 
range of capital assets, were much more resilient to the effects of environmental hazards. 
However, in seeking to avoid the potential tautology to studying vulnerability – that people are 
vulnerable, and they are vulnerable because they are poor (O’Keefe and Middleton, 1998), the 
livelihoods approach is critiqued for how different ideas are conceived, whether any significant 
factors are ‘missed’ by the framework, and whether a more relational approach could perhaps 
shed new insight on exploring construction and reproduction of rural societies. The idea of 
deproletarianization is introduced to provide a potential explanation for the trends identified 
through the research. 
Research Method and Context 
The framework in which the analysis of vulnerability is located is that of the hazards paradigm. 
The research explored the differentiation of vulnerability through assessing households’ 
capacity to respond and adapt to actual and predicted hazards that constrain livelihood 
construction option (Wisner et al., 2004). It was also important to explore the range of capitals 
produced and commanded by households; this allowed relationships between particular capital 
generating strategies and variation in exposure to natural and socio-economic hazards to be 
explored. The research was framed using the livelihoods approach. This framework enabled a 
range of quantitative and qualitative research methods, including two semi-structured household 
surveys (one of 1089 households, one of 89), structured observation, and key informant 
interviews and transects walks, to be analyzed, compared and triangulated. The livelihoods 
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approach used in this study drew heavily upon Scoones (1998) and DFID (2000). This mixed 
methods approach was intended to capture as much detail as possible regarding how 
livelihoods are constructed in the case study area. Figure 4.1 shows the research location. 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of research location  
 
Source: Author 
The slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro were amongst the most productive areas in what was to 
become mainland Tanzania. The Chagga people became one of the most advanced societies in 
the region, and were amongst the first to establish and develop chiefdoms. This was primarily 
due to the surplus production of banana crops (Coulson, 1982).  The most significant impact of 
the colonial period was the transition to a cash-based economy. The German colonialists 
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achieved this through the imposition of a hut tax, a policy that required indigenous people to sell 
either their labor or surplus produce. Following the independence of Tanganyika in 1967 
President Nyerere announced that the country would pursue a policy of ‘Ujamaa’, a form of 
African socialism. The main facets of this process were nationalization of industry and a process 
of ‘villigization’ where peasant farmers were resettled, sometimes forcibly (Coulson, 1982). This 
proved effective in some contexts; levels of literacy and access to healthcare increased 
nationwide, however the economy was affected significantly and many people, including the 
Chagga, generally disapproved of the process. 
The low, and sometimes negative, levels of economic growth throughout the 1980s were 
succeeded by higher rates; there has not, however, been a commensurate reduction in 
indicators of poverty to complement these economic gains. Reduction of poverty is the priority of 
the current administration and it is thought that the most appropriate method to achieve this is 
through enhancing the GDP of the country (URT, 2005). The current socio-economic climate in 
Tanzania is characterized by an increasing integration into the global economy and a wide 
prevalence of poverty in the country (Ellis, 1998; Ellis and Mdoe, 2004). 
Kilimanjaro Region is located in northern Tanzania and consists of six districts: Rombo, 
Mwanga, Same, Moshi Rural, Hai and Moshi Urban. The population at the time of the 2002 
census was 2,097,166 (NBS, 2002). The region covers an area of 13,209 km², the smallest 
region in Tanzania. It has a population density of 159 persons per square kilometer (NBS, 
2002). The population density varies dramatically from up to 650 in the Chagga homegardens to 
less than 50 in the lowland plains. The topography of the area ranges from Kibo peak, the 
highest point on the African continent (5986m.a.s.l.), to the lowlands of the Maasai steppe (700-
900m.a.s.l.) (NBS, 2002). The climate on the southern slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro is characterized 
by a bimodal rainfall distribution; the ‘long’ rains occur from March to May and the ‘short’ rains 
are between October and November. Total annual rainfall primarily depends on the success of 
the short rains and the onset, intensity and duration of the long rains. 
The people who became the Chagga initially practiced a form of what would now be regarded 
as agroforestry; trees that were not deemed useful were cleared whilst those that served a 
practical purpose were retained and managed (Fernandes et al., 1984). The Chagga became 
influential in the caravan trade that traversed the African continent from the Indian Ocean inland. 
Through this process they acquired tools, weapons and other implements that enable the 
society to develop its productive and reproductive forces (Coulson, 1982). A consequence of 
this relationship was the receptiveness of the Chagga with regard to acceptance of new ideas, 
products and beliefs of different cultures. This aspect of their society was to prove significant 
when Europeans colonized the area at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The effects of colonialism in Kilimanjaro Region qualitatively changed the social relations that 
previously existed. The arrival of Catholic and Lutheran missionaries was accompanied by the 
arrival of coffee, the crop that became the major export crop of the area (Coulson, 1982; Moore, 
1986). The German period of colonial rule from 1886 to 1916 changed many customs, culture 
and laws. Military defeat by the Germans meant the chiefs had to rely on colonial power to 
maintain authority. The introduction by the chiefs of a cattle tax is one example of how social 
relations were transformed in this period. (Moore 1986). 
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The colonial period saw the introduction of formal education as well as the introduction of 
coffee. This accelerated in the 1920s (Coulson, 1982). At this point the colony was a British 
protectorate. As the climatic and topographic conditions were ideal for this crop, production 
spread and increased. Within twenty years there were estimated to be significantly more than 
five million coffee trees planted on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro (Coulson, 1982).The British 
protectorate period also saw the creation and development of the Kilimanjaro Native 
Cooperative Union (KNCU), which enabled a good price to be received by growers but also 
resulted in the Chagga becoming one of the most educated societies in East Africa. Levies were 
charged by the union to support primary, secondary and tertiary education for members and 
their families (Coulson, 1982). 
The population living on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro increased significantly during the colonial 
period. Howard and Millard (1997) suggest that religious teaching, particularly Catholic, 
contributed to this; cultural taboos had previously existed regarding the spacing of children and 
women were not expected to become pregnant until they had finished breastfeeding their 
previous child. These social pressures were usurped by religious edicts emanating from Europe. 
At independence many Chagga people held important roles in the new government due to their 
relatively high levels of education (Coulson, 1982). When Tanzania was unified, and then 
Nyerere embarked on his ‘Ujamaa’ program, the Chagga were amongst the most rigorous 
opponents, and in parallel saw the influence of their union ebb (Coulson, 1982). Livelihoods in 
the region since have been affected by the impacts of structural adjustment, declining 
commodity prices and the continued growth in population (Soini, 2005). It is necessary to 
consider how they are currently constructed. 
Livelihoods in Kilimanjaro Region are constructed primarily through agricultural methods. The 
average household size is 5.2 hectares and eighty four per cent of households are male headed 
(URT, 2006b). The Kilimanjaro region  has the highest percentage of literacy in Tanzanian rural 
areas of eighty six per cent (URT, 2006b).The typical Chagga family would have a ‘kihamba’, or 
homegarden, that would comprise their residence and on which bananas and coffee were 
usually the principal crops. The kihamba would often also have a vegetable garden on which 
various green vegetables could be grown for consumption and for sale. A homestead would 
also usually have access to an area of lower altitude land, a ‘shamba’, on which the main crops 
grown would be maize, beans and sunflowers. The homegardens would have a large range of 
tree and plant species alongside the primary crops; Fernandes et al. (1984) identified over fifty 
species that were utilized by the Chagga for various purposes. The farming is fairly intensive, 
although prices received by farmers for some produce is significantly higher than other parts of 
Tanzania (URT, 2006a). In Kilimanjaro Region seventy per cent of households state that there 
are inadequate quantities of land for them to sustain their livelihoods, which is the second 
highest proportion in Tanzania; eighty five per cent of the population are thought to be involved 
in agriculture on a full time basis (URT, 2006b). 
Livestock husbandry is a significant component of livelihood construction for most households in 
Kilimanjaro Region. The number of pigs, sheep and goats in the region is moderate to low when 
compared with the rest of Tanzania but the density of animals is amongst the highest. Access to 
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livestock and agricultural extension services is also amongst the highest in the country. 
Diseases affecting livestock and the use of animals for draught are relatively low (URT, 2006a). 
One of the significant problems that afflict people living on Mt. Kilimanjaro is that of food 
insecurity. Howard and Millard (1997) discuss the paradox of one of the wealthiest regions in 
Tanzania suffering from one of the highest levels of malnutrition; causes are suggested to be 
social factors that stigmatize the food insecure and malnourished, and culturally inappropriate 
responses that do not appreciate the role of shame in preventing hungry people from receiving 
assistance publicly. HIV/AIDS is having a significant effect on the economic and social relations 
and capabilities of the region. It is estimated that seven per cent of fifteen to forty nine year olds 
are affected by the disease (UNDP, 2006), but these figures are uncertain due to reluctance to 
be tested and the potentially negative consequences that can result from a positive diagnosis; 
eighty three per cent of the population have not been tested for the disease (NBS, 2005). 
Kilimanjaro region has been described as facing significant risks from climate change (Agrwalia 
et al., 2003; Mwandosya et al., 1998). It is projected that there will be a rise in mean 
temperature, while the changes in precipitation levels are yet uncertain. Development of more 
specialized computer models that work on a scale as small as the Tanzanian slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro are required before it is possible to ascertain either way. The changes could have 
both positive and negative effects with regard to agricultural production. With this understanding 
it is predicted that coffee and cotton production could be expanded whereas maize production 
could see a marked decrease. Adaptation can not only guard against adverse impacts but 
harness potential benefits. Adaptation and coping mechanisms should not only be considered in 
terms of climate change in isolation but through a wider ranging analysis of exogenous and 
endogenous pressures (Agrwalia et al., 2003; Mwandosya et al., 1998). Climate change, its 
impacts and the options for adaptation  should be understood in the context of household 
livelihood construction. 
Discussion of Vulnerability 
Vulnerability emerged as a focal concept through the natural hazards paradigm, specifically 
from the acknowledgement that ‘natural’ disasters were not affecting social groups in a uniform 
manner; socio-economic factors differentiated the (likely) impact of a hazard on a 
heterogeneous society. In the context of disaster risk reduction, resilience is often construed as 
the ‘flipside’ of vulnerability, without being necessarily tautological (Manyena, 2007) Adaptive 
capacity is a corollary of hazard studies, so is of fundamental importance to explorations of how 
people construct livelihoods in a dynamic, variable environment. 
The livelihoods approach can be placed within a broad political ecology framework, and this in 
conjunction with the definition of vulnerability provided by the book At Risk produced a 
conceptual basis for understanding the challenges to the sustaining of livelihoods on Kilimanjaro 
under a varying, and potentially changing, climate. The Scoones (1998)/DfID (2000) framework, 
conceptualizes vulnerability as comprising shocks, trends, and seasonality. Vulnerability is 
initially discussed using this framework, and the important findings from the research are 
identified. The framework is subsequently critiqued for its appropriateness in identifying and 
establishing the full range of multi-scalar processes that constrain or enable livelihood options. 
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Shocks that increase the vulnerability of affected populations are short term, rapid onset events 
(DFID, 2000). In Kilimanjaro region, these will potentially include drought, flooding, hunger and 
food insecurity. The research explores two factors that can both cause and illustrate features of 
vulnerability: drought and times of hunger. 
Drought is probably the most serious natural hazard that affects the livelihoods of people in 
Kilimanjaro Region.  Seventy two per cent of respondents stated that drought had a great 
impact on their agricultural productivity, fifty nine per cent claimed that it had a great impact on 
their health and thirty two per cent perceived it as having a great impact on availability of energy 
sources. When asked to identify the last time a drought affected the area they reside in, a wide 
variation of years was recorded, indicating that the effects can be very localized. However, 
some particularly large scale droughts were identified. As the survey was designed to identify 
the last time a drought affected an area it was not possible to ascertain the relative seriousness 
of each drought year, however, a pattern emerged in which major droughts appear to recur on a 
decadal basis; 1974, 1984, 1994 and 2004-5 account for fifty nine per cent of responses to the 
question ‘When were you last affected by drought?’. Twenty one per cent of respondents stated 
that they had never been affected by drought; this suggests that access to different water 
sources can compensate for a reduction in rainfall in a given year, and also supports the 
contestation that the effects of drought can be extremely localized.  
Long term trends in natural and socio-economic processes can alter the vulnerability of 
societies. In the context of this research these may include enhanced climatic change, climatic 
variability, increased impacts of El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events, and a decline in 
prices received for commodities such as coffee. 
Other potential impacts of climatic change include the possibility of increased incidence of 
drought and flooding, which may be associated with a complementary rise in ENSO activity. 
This implies that the increased variability of precipitation may be a more significant issue 
affecting adaptation of household livelihood strategies in the region than absolute change. 
Rainfall records obtained in the case study area indicated that variability in both the time of 
onset of rains and the absolute amount received was substantial on a year to year basis. This 
indicates that livelihoods are already being constructed in the face of a dynamic climatic context, 
and although climate change may exacerbate these trends it is not likely to produce new 
threats. 
The population in Kilimanjaro Region has grown significantly since Tanzanian independence. 
The effects of this process have mainly been perceived by local people as a scarcity of available 
land; seventy per cent of households complain about the shortage of suitable areas, which is 
the second highest level of displeasure recorded in the country (URT, 2006). Forty six per cent 
of respondents stated that their farming methods had altered in the preceding five years. Of 
those who had changed their methods, sixty eight per cent identified a change in the climate as 
the primary factor; also significant was soil exhaustion, which was the reason for change for 
nineteen per cent of households. Another trend that has to be considered is the declining 
importance of coffee production in the construction of livelihoods in the case study location. The 
declining real price of coffee, once the exchange rate is taken into account, and the declining 
importance of coffee grown in Kilimanjaro relative to Tanzania as a whole are symptomatic of 
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the challenges of achieving a sustainable livelihood on Mt. Kilimanjaro which remains highly 
reliant on agriculture. 
 
Variation in availability of assets, entitlements, opportunities and requirements throughout the 
year corresponds with differentiation of vulnerability on a household and collective level (DFID, 
1999). Most of the information regarding seasonal vulnerability in the case study location was 
obtained through the production of a seasonality calendar, which formed part of the secondary 
survey. Seventy two seasonality calendars were completed by individual households. The 
secondary survey took place in the same locations as the primary data collection, but the 
households visited varied. The main findings are detailed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Results from seasonality calendar 
Issue Findings 
School Fees January and July are when this expenditure is required; no 
variation between highlands and lowlands  
Difficulty obtaining fuelwood Hardest to obtain during long rains (April) and short rains 
(November/December); 85-90% of respondents in lowlands 
had difficulty obtaining fuelwood at these times, much lower 
percentage in the highlands 
Difficulty obtaining water In upper zone August and September most difficult times; in 
lower zone at least three quarters of respondents have 
difficulty obtaining water between July and October 
Marketing Coffee Coffee primarily marketed in July and August; more people 
marketing coffee in the highlands than the lowlands 
Marketing Bananas In the highlands marketing of bananas occurs throughout the 
year; greatest amount is marketed in May. In the lowlands less 
people produce bananas for market and in January, 




August was the month when most work was sought in the 
highest reaches of the highlands; in the lowlands most 







The research identified the important factors related to generation of each type of capital asset. 
It is necessary to explore the inter-relationships between different capitals, as enhancing one 
could be detrimental to the other assets. Possibilities for enhancing capital assets are 
considered, along with a discussion of possible consequences for other capitals. 
Human capital is relatively high in Kilimanjaro Region, especially when compared with other 
parts of Tanzania. Primary school enrollment is amongst the highest in the country, and virtually 
everyone has access to healthcare, although the quality and availability of this varies 
significantly. Potential opportunities for human capital enhancement exist in increasing the 
amount of people who obtain at least a secondary education, and in concurrence with Soini 
(2005), improving access towards and quality of the extension service. Constraints include 
financing an expansion of both secondary education and the extension service.  
The level of natural capital in the case study location has been shown to be high, and 
particularly important in the livelihood construction of those households that do not have access 
to significant sources of off-farm income. As the levels of biodiversity and biomass in the 
Chagga homegardens play an important, if not defined role in the water management system on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro and its foothills, the possibility of payment for ecological services should be 
investigated further. A potential method for financing this would be through an international 
facility such as the Clean Development Mechanism. The major constraints for enhancing natural 
capital in the area are the previously discussed restrictions on intensifying and extensifying the 
homegarden farming system, and sourcing sustainable funding for the concept of payment for 
ecological services. 
The quality and quantity of physical capital, particularly infrastructure, varies markedly between 
districts in the case study area. Although there are relatively high levels of infrastructure when 
compared with other parts of Tanzania, the areas with greater stated income generally had 
greater levels of infrastructure. This was observable for public assets such as roads as well as 
personal assets such as private water pipes. A process which will be completed within three 
years in Rombo District, to tarmac the road to the Kenyan border, is the greatest opportunity 
observed for enhancing physical capital. The primary constraint to expanding physical assets 
elsewhere is the high initial and ongoing expenditure. Individual indicators of physical capital are 
likely to increase as a result of increases in other capitals, particularly financial capital (Soini, 
2005). 
Over half of financial capital generation on Mt. Kilimanjaro is made up of off-farm income 
sources including remittances. Therefore, a focus on opportunities to increase the level of off-
farm income, particularly for those households in Rombo District, is a potential pathway to 
enhancing financial capital. An example of how this could be achieved is through the promotion 
and support of local businesses. There is potential for increasing on-farm production, 
particularly with regard to adding value to primary produce, and increasing output and hence 
financial returns, through intensification of agricultural and agroforestry activities. 
Commensurate to all these goals is the possibility of expanding various forms of micro-finance 
and micro-credit schemes, which are currently accessible by a small minority of households. 
	  
50	  
Constraints are the high level of investment required when instigating these schemes and the 
increased burden of risk placed on households if appropriate safety nets are not also enacted. 
 Social capital, particularly in the form of informal networks, has declined in importance from the 
pre-colonial era. Those households in the lowlands that may be considered most vulnerable to 
the effects of drought rely more on formal government support in times of need than the 
relatively wealthier respondents further up the mountain. Opportunities for enhancing social 
capital are likely to be greatest in supporting and funding local NGO’s, CBO’s and formalizing 
local institutions. Collective action can provide the individual members with greater income 
generating opportunities, with regard to both on-farm and off-farm capitals generating activities. 
Ensuring sustainable funding, the initial capital requirements to create these groups and 
problems with ensuring equal access are the main constraints to enhancing social capital. 
Increasing the quantity of individual capital assets can affect the level of other capitals. This can 
occur in a positive manner; an increase in human capital can provide information on best 
practice farming techniques, therefore enhancing levels of natural and financial capital. An 
increase in physical capital could provide better access to markets and more reliable sources of 
water, with positive effects for levels of financial and human capital. Increasing social capital 
might improve dissemination of best practice, provide access to appropriate tools and 
strengthen the position of producers; this can potentially increase levels of human, physical and 
financial capital. However, the process can work in the opposite direction. Enhancing human 
capital may persuade people that improved livelihood options exist away from the homestead, 
with subsequent negative effects on natural capital. Increasing financial capital through 
additional sources of off-farm income can reduce the quantity of natural capital through neglect 
of the farm, affect human capital through a reduction in location specific agricultural knowledge 
and negatively influence social capital because of a lack of previously shared common interests 
between households. Therefore any interventions need to be carefully considered for all 
potential consequences.  
Examples of diversification options that could potentially be utilized include intensification and 
extensification of agricultural methods, and increased reliance on off-farm income. The potential 
for these methods to be taken advantage of by the Chagga will now be assessed. 
In the higher and middle zones of the Chagga homegardens potential for intensification is 
limited by several factors; primarily the unfeasibility of mechanizing production on steep slopes 
and the difficulty in obtaining chemical inputs, either through unavailability of credit to purchase 
or removal of previously subsidized supply. Other intensification options include indigenous 
forms of terracing, utilization of improved seeds, increased application of manure and compost, 
cultivation of higher value agroforestry species and higher yielding livestock varieties (Soini, 
2005). Although potential for improvement exists in all these areas, there is a significant caveat, 
which must be considered. Mdoe and Wiggins (1997) touch on this issue when discussing 
smallholder dairying on Mt. Kilimanjaro. With the absence of many direct subsidies for 
households, the burden of risk in any intensification process is placed almost entirely on the 
farmer. They discuss this problem in the context of intensifying dairy production, but the problem 
is equally important regarding other opportunities for intensification. When the inherently 
variable climate of Mt. Kilimanjaro is factored in, the risk burden is probably unsustainable and 
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outweighs the potential benefits; provision of formal support networks, for both inputs and as a 
form of safety net if the intensification process founders, is required if this option is to be 
pursued.     
The potential for extensification of the Chagga farming system is constrained by a number of 
factors. The upper limit of the homegarden system is the Kilimanjaro National Park. Although 
there is the presence of a ‘half-mile strip’, that is jointly controlled and managed by local and 
national authorities, the possibility for clearance and settlement on higher altitudes does not 
exist. At the lower reaches of the system, what was described as savannah two decades ago 
(Fernandes et al., 1984; Moore, 1986) is now almost entirely under cultivation. This is either in 
the form of lowland farms that are usually a mixture of maize, sunflower and beans, or an 
attempt to replicate the Chagga homegarden system on less watered and fertile land further 
down the slopes. The former method has existed longer historically, and is based around crops 
that are perhaps more suited to this agro-ecological zone. The latter technique, as 
demonstrated by the poor quality of banana plants and other crops when compared with higher 
up the slope, makes it unlikely that livelihoods can be sustained in these areas by on-farm 
activities alone. The lack of available land on the mountain, and the difficulty of accessing plots 
that may be a significant distance away from the homestead, suggests that opportunities for 
extensifying the system are severely constrained. 
Off-farm income has been shown to be the most significant aspect of income generation with 
regard to livelihood construction on Mt. Kilimanjaro. Due to the previously described restrictions 
on increasing on-farm production, it is therefore pertinent to explore potential to expand the off-
farm income of households in the study area. Off-farm income can be categorized into 
temporary, seasonal or permanent migration for work.  It can occur on a local, regional or 
national scale. Significant local sources of off-farm income include work related to tourism on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro, particularly in Marangu in Moshi Rural District, and laboring on other farms. This 
association with the tourist trade is the primary reason for the difference in average income 
between Moshi Rural and Rombo districts. These options are restricted geographically and 
temporally. Regional and national migration, to Moshi, Arusha and Dar es Salaam, provides a 
greater income earning potential.  The relatively high educational attainment of people in 
Kilimanjaro Region in comparison with other parts of Tanzania indicates that potential exists for 
quality, salaried work if migration is considered as a livelihood option. The relatively high quality 
of much of the housing observed, and the relatively high levels of remittances recorded, 
suggests that much wealth generated elsewhere is transferred back to this region. However, 
increasing reliance on off-farm income can have significant consequences for on-farm 
production. The most apparent is the reduction of available labor on the farm, although if off-
farm income is sufficient then labor can be hired. This process is highly gendered. As those who 
migrate tend to be the most active male members of a family, those left on the homegarden are 
likely to be female, the elderly or young, who may not possess the physical condition or 
knowledge to cultivate as successfully as possible. The reduction in time spent undertaking 
agricultural activities can reduce knowledge of the techniques required to maintain the complex 
homegardens. Consequentially, the cumulative effect of these actions could be a reduction in 
the biodiversity and biomass of the area could occur, which may then affect the water 




The potential for enhancing livelihoods options identified through the livelihoods approach 
methodology has been identified. However, it is necessary to critically interrogate the findings of 
this research and the nature of how available options for change are manifested. It is also 
important to attempt to reconcile the recommendations of the research output with theories of 
development, social transformation and differing conceptions about what this means for 
‘peasant’ societies. Three factors are considered here in relation to the fieldwork observations; 
an increasing reliance on off-farm sources of income as a method of reducing vulnerability to 
the effects of climatic change or variability, the relationships between the case study location 
and surrounding urban areas, and whether these processes can be characterized as an 
increasing proletarianization of the peasantry.  
Returning to Leichenko and O’Brien’s (2000) conceptualization of ‘double exposure’, it is 
apparent, and not necessarily paradoxical, that an increased reliance on off-farm income is 
likely to reduce (direct) impacts of climatic change/variability on livelihood construction, but may 
increase the vulnerability to socio-economic factors. This will be particularly relevant if social 
reproduction is made more difficult or precarious because of an increasing reliance on insecure 
income generating opportunities. However, those who do manage to obtain stable streams of 
off-farm income will be less vulnerable to both socio-economic and environmental processes, in 
comparison both with their previous livelihood strategies and with those within the case study 
location.  
This differentiation suggests that a focus on proletarianization as a process involving the 
increase in reliance on selling labor at one pole, and increasing concentration of wealth within 
society at another pole, may provide a framework for exploring the relationship between 
livelihood construction on Mt. Kilimanjaro and processes of uneven capitalist expansion, 
expropriation and beneficiation. In view of this insight, perhaps it would be productive to move 
beyond a binary on/off farm sources of income. A focus on availability or requirement of 
agricultural production and petty commodities for subsistence, reliance on wage labor as 
primary source of social reproduction, or ability subsistence, reliance on wage labor as primary 
source of social reproduction, or ability to command labor and control the products of said labor 
is more instructive than simply whether work takes place on or off the farm. Off-farm income, in 
the form of working for other farmers, or in the non-agricultural economy, can be justifiably 
characterized as an aspect of the process of differentiation of a society that was originally 
primarily subsistence based.  Tom Brass’s (2011a; 2011b) ideas of deproletarianization are 
highly relevant here, as very few households in the case study are able to commodify their labor 
at a level that enables adequate levels of household reproduction.  
(Adaptation to) Climate Change 
Processes of households relating to nature, as well as their social relations of production and 
reproduction, should be understood dialectically. The livelihoods approach is an appropriate 
methodological framework for exploring people’s potential capabilities, opportunities and 
constraints regarding capital asset generation. It is a less appropriate framework for ‘scaling up’ 
from this household level focus and linking environmental and socio-economic sources of 
vulnerability to considering the political economic context which constricts and determines 
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available coping mechanisms for the most vulnerable social groups in response to 
environmental risk (Scoones, 2009). The critique most regularly applied to the livelihoods 
approach is that it fails to account for the political relations, and hence political capital 
possessed by different persons within a given socio-economic context. Alternative, adjusted 
versions of the livelihoods approach have been suggested. One alternative version is proposed 
by Collinson et al (2002); it includes an ‘asset hexagon’, political capital being included as the 
sixth asset. However, livelihoods approaches say very little about how these asset generating 
strategies relate to broader ideas of rural transformation. Livelihood diversification, for example, 
is one means by which (in the livelihoods approach) households are attempting to increase the 
sustainability of their asset generating strategies. However, introducing the concept of 
deproletarianization raises a new question: what if livelihood diversification strategies are 
actually a consequence of the inability of rural households to commodify their labor in order to 
achieve household reproduction? 
Increasing the quantity of individual capital assets can affect the level of other capitals. This can 
occur in a positive manner; an increase in human capital can provide information on best 
practice farming techniques, therefore enhancing levels of natural and financial capital. An 
increase in physical capital could provide better access to markets and more reliable sources of 
water, with positive effects for levels of financial and human capital. Increasing social capital 
might improve dissemination of best practice, provide access to appropriate tools and 
strengthen the position of producers; this can potentially increase levels of human, physical and 
financial capital. However, the process can work in the opposite direction. Enhancing human 
capital may persuade people that improved livelihood options exist away from the homestead, 
with subsequent negative effects on natural capital. Increasing financial capital through 
additional sources of off-farm income can reduce the quantity of natural capital through neglect 
of the farm, affect human capital through a reduction in location specific agricultural knowledge 
and negatively influence social capital because of a lack of previously shared common interests 
between households. 
 
This research is underpinned by several concepts and theories that are fundamental to both the 
nature of what is being studied and the areas of focus that it identifies. Emphasis is placed on 
the relationship between different processes, identification of contradictions or tension within 
and between these processes, and potential pathways through which these contradictions may 
play out in the material realm. In studies that seek to explore society-nature interactions, it is not 
always the case that the conception of how ‘nature’, and societies relation to it, are clearly 
theorized. Following from Smith’s (2009) conception of the production of nature, under 
capitalism production is the process by which the society-nature dualism that permeates much 
social science can be overcome. What needs further exploration is how far the concept of 
production of nature can be extended into societies that are not totally integrated into the 
capitalist system. First, let us consider the relationship between the two frameworks. 
The natural capital of a household is those natural resources that it can command in order to 
achieve social reproduction and production. Disregarding questions about what is ‘natural’, this 
can be seen to be of huge importance to those societies who still largely rely on small scale, 
often subsistence agriculture. It is apparent that this concept could be considered within 
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Harvey’s framework, but it is not quite as simple as saying the relation to nature equates to the 
category of natural capital in the framework.  Basing this framework in the theory of the 
production of nature it is possible to begin to explore the relationships between these different 
processes. For example: 
· The relationship between social relations and the relation to nature would appear to be a 
good starting point for investigating how access to resources are decided, enforced and 
limited. This can go further to explore what is to be exploited, who decides, and on 
whose terms, these decisions are made. 
· Is the relationship to nature (conceived of as production) undermined by unsustainable 
use of the natural resource/ecological base? O’Connor’s (1998) 2nd contradiction of 
capitalism would argue yes, under capitalism. But is the system on Mt. Kilimanjaro truly 
capitalist? Is the presence of some kind of capitalism all that is required for the 
contradiction to hold? 
· The relation between the relation to nature and the reproduction of daily life. Or another 
way, how much of what is grown on the farm is used for household subsistence. How 
much of household subsistence and reproduction relies on producing from nature. What 
other inputs are required for household reproduction? When these factors change, how 
does the relationship to nature change? For example, if there is more reliance on off 
farm income/cash crops then how is biodiversity affected? 
· The relation between mental conceptions of the world and the relation to nature. There 
must be space for plural conceptions of the same material factor. For example, in the 
case of land, the perception of the relation to land is likely to vary depending on the level 
of subsistence, alienation from the land, the labor undertook on the land and the time 
spent away from the land amongst other things. 
It is argued that these examples show the many linkages that exist between the two 
frameworks. Many research methods are also commensurate with both approaches. All things 
that are described in the livelihoods approach can be studied in the Harvey framework, but with 
an added emphasis on how changing one aspect of a livelihood strategy can affect all other 
factors of which it is related to. The original livelihoods framework and my original research 
highlighted the importance of linkages between different types of assets and explored whether 
they could be mutually constitutive – Harvey provides the framework to flesh out and explore 
these relationships. 
An ability to see that a change in one of the processes (say, mode of production), necessitates 
a change in the relations with other processes (relation to nature, technological change etc.). 
Moving beyond a binary of seeking the causative/principle agent in a process, or holding that all 
relations have a contingent basis in place or space are dependent on that very contingency for 
signification of importance, this framework seeks, and I believe enables the researcher, to not 
only hold (conceptually) the notion that these reflections of dynamic processes can (indeed 
must) be understood together, but also enables an assessment of what relationships appear to 
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be of greatest importance in understanding social development and transformation, if and when 
it has occurred. 
An example of this can be seen with a focus on the relation to nature. The growth of cash 
cropping (primarily coffee) on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, not only changed the relation to nature 
(primarily ‘husbandry’ to a mix of ‘husbandry’ and ‘mastery’). Social differentiation occurred 
within the Chagga society as those households that successfully grew coffee achieved a 
hitherto unprecedented level of income. The general shift in diet with regard to the primary 
carbohydrate source shows the power of mental conceptions in both shaping, and being shaped 
by, the idea of plantains vs. maize as a more less reliable source of social reproduction 
(likelihood of crop failure, likelihood of achieving enough to subsist on rather than necessarily 
maximizing yield), production (profit maximization, access to markets, role of producer in 
relation to middlemen, processors) and technology (can one crop or the other be produced 
more effectively given new technology, has technology enabled planting of crops in areas 
previously unsuited – again necessitating a change in the relationship to nature) etc. 
These then need to be thought through whatever normative assumptions of the theory that is 
both underpinning and being shaped by the research. From the perspective of the livelihoods 
framework, the professed goal is more sustainable (vaguely defined) livelihood outcomes. 
Within the context of the framework several ‘classical’ small-scale development interventions 
were identified that could potentially (if not definitely) enhance metric measurements of any of 
the five capital assets. With careful regard as to how interaction between different capital asset 
generation strategies could negatively or positively affect ‘stocks’ of other capital assets (the 
initial kernel for me for being drawn to more dialectical ways of thinking about this issue), and 
exploration of the role of formal and non-formal institutions in mediating this access to livelihood 
options, a set of feasible, achievable, pragmatic options can be produced and recommended. 
The actor-centered livelihoods framework is likely to provide actor-orientated development 
objectives that simultaneously essentialize, and freeze in space and time the whole range of 
existing social relations that may be as important as actor-opportunities in shaping the livelihood 
options open to different societies. Human, physical, natural, social and financial capital can be 
conceived of as ‘containers’ in which we fill in all the data points for the representative 
categorical indicators, attempt to crudely ascertain the marginal utility of each factor, explore the 
limitations to a vaguely defined ‘more sustainable future’, and assess which of these factors is 
most likely to provide the most receptive to a development intervention.  
This argument, if justifiable, is very similar to the conception of absolute space described by 
Harvey. Much like Harvey’s conceptualization of space, the idea of relational space must be 
held at the same time as the idea of absolute space. In the case of the livelihoods framework, 
the absolute conception of these capital assets is all that is available for consideration – 
therefore social relations, particularly between class interests as they emerge or other forms of 
more populist resistance are not merely downplayed in the framework, but impossible to 
consider using its non-relational categories. This is why simply attempting to consider ‘political 
capital’ as a sixth asset, and then to explore its importance is not only a highly difficult task, it is 
proffering an unsuitable solution. Political power, both formal and informal, hidden and visible, 
legitimate or not, is prevalent in entitlement to, access to, and proceeds of the production 
process at varying stages, and ultimately is an expression of the social relations that determine 
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livelihood options. Different mental conceptions (be they spiritual, aesthetic or otherwise) of the 
value of different parts of a livelihood system undoubtedly exist, but the struggle (and 
specifically ability) to make these discourses hegemonic (or at least be heard) is the struggle of 
differentiated groups to establish (a form of) control over the means to socially produce and 
reproduce. This interface cleaves along many different aspects (gender, age, race), can be 
celebrated as a good thing in itself (Scott, 1978), and can be the basis of identity celebration of 
different groups based on temporarily stabilized conceptions of essentialized social groups. The 
argument made here is that a focus on the relation is fundamental, and in agreeing with this it is 
also apparent that this provides an entryway for the ideas of Brass (2011a; 2011b). What links 
the livelihoods on Mt. Kilimanjaro with countless others globally is the fact that they have been 
exposed to a greater or lesser degree to the expansion of the capitalist mode of production. This 
interaction has fundamentally altered, in almost every conceivable case, existing relations to 
nature, of production and reproduction, of technological usage and advancement, and of mental 
conceptions of social and individual identity. Therefore, if livelihoods studies are to be of greater 
use they have to tease out the relationships between broad theories of social change and the 
snapshot of day-to-day activities that a livelihoods approach provides. 
With this in mind, it is necessary to return to the original issue, that of adaptation to climate 
change, and explore: 1) Where it fits into this theoretical framework, 2) What are the 
fundamental questions to be asked when climate change is placed in this framework, 3) What 
are the important social relations that are driving the need to respond to a changing climate, the 
relations that require or encourage people to undertake livelihood options that are imperiled by 
projected swings in both variability and extremes of climate, and who is likely to benefit if 
existing adaptation proposals are implemented. The makeup of society on Kilimanjaro will 
always be dynamic, and simply focusing on those who work the land now neglects both those 
who have already left, through force or (lack of) choice, and the different social relations within 
the society. Is it really that likely that climate change is going to be a threat of much greater 
magnitude alone than the interaction of Structural Adjustment Policies and prolonged drought in 
the 1980’s, or abrupt and devastating drops (alongside a long term general downward trend) in 
commodity prices. In conjunction with these, it may. But these other processes are currently 
retarding the livelihood options available to most of the world’s population regardless of future 
climatic change, and many potential measures to mitigate or adapt to climatic change 
(protection for biodiversity, natural resource conservation) may simply entrench, or worse, 
increase the differentiation between peripheral regions and the core (nationally/globally/locally). 
With regards to issues of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity therefore, the following 
issues are now center place. If development is conceived of as a material increase in the well-
being of a given society (with specific focus on how the most vulnerable and marginalized can 
both improve (and have improved) their livelihoods then it is evident how development relates to 
the goals and the concepts of resilience, especially if perceived not reactively 
(‘bouncebackability’) but proactively (‘bounceforwardability’). Subsistence producers, 
smallholders, peasants, farming households (however defined) are undoubtedly marginal in the 
context of the global centers of financial capital (classically defined, not as per the livelihoods 
approach), but this is not at the expense of highly differentiated strata within societies. 
Development interventions which focus on maintaining current, or slightly adapted modes of 
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production are likely to be favored by both the ‘development community’ and many local people 
whose livelihoods are the object of this intervention. Without a proper appreciation of who 
stands to benefit and lose on a local level from development interventions (i.e. those who 
already have land, those who can command labor) may well have the effect of increasing the 
vulnerability of the worst off in these societies whilst simultaneously generating larger surpluses 










This paper challenges the conventional notion of how vulnerability is addressed. It extends and 
deepens the conventional critique of how the coupled nature of environmental and economic 
change are understood. It integrates theory and empirical evidence dialectically to demonstrate 
the centrality of social relations to transformation of vulnerability in rural livelihoods, using 
examples from Tanzania. It concludes with an exploration of the question of scale in studies of 





Global contemporary debate is focused on accelerated climate change because of the increase 
in anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses. At a global level, analysis is focused on the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), specifically IPCC5 (IPCC, 2014), and the 
evidence offered to them by interested groups (SREX IPCC, 2012). In relation to adaptation to 
climate change in Tanzania, the work of Working Group 2 is of particular interest. Increasingly, 
with an emphasis on adaptation, these reports address the issue of vulnerability (Tschakert et 
al., 2013). There have been a proliferation of papers exploring the vulnerability of individuals, 
households, communities and societies to the impacts of climate change. The notion of 
vulnerability is multi- faceted (Adger, 2006) but is also contested (Kelman, 2008). 
 
Conventional studies of vulnerability assign both ‘social’ and ‘natural’ drivers of vulnerability as 
essentially equal in their determining potential. Understanding vulnerability in this context is 
essentially a question of identifying and quantifying the relevant sources, then adding them 
together. This is dangerous because the supposed mathematical, neutral approach, posits an 
apolitical nature, and disguises the social relations and processes that drive differentiated 
vulnerability.  The argument advanced is that many studies of vulnerability fail to identify the 
structural causes of vulnerability, particularly their specificity under a capitalist mode of 
production. 
 
One specific version of vulnerability, derived from the natural hazards literature, has existed as 
a research position since the 1970s. (O’Keefe et al., 1976). It is only with recent iterations of the 
IPCC Assessment Reports that the importance of vulnerability, for both the political and 
scientific implications of understanding societal adaptation to climate change, has begun to be 
appreciated (Tschakert et al., 2013). This paper seeks to reinforce the validity of this version of 
vulnerability, making it central to any studies of climate change. It contextualizes the claims 
made by Tschakert et al. (2013) about the need to place structural-relational ideas of 
vulnerability at the heart of adaptation to climate change research, and broader development 
and disaster risk reduction goals. It does so by presenting a tripartite division of the vulnerability 
literature, into conventional approaches, critiques of conventional approaches, and radical 
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approaches, and provides summaries of these classes of literature.  It then explores the 
characteristics of each literature using case material from Tanzania. This case material is 
generated both from secondary sources and field data addressing vulnerability. These are 
analyzed and discussed in relation to how household vulnerability is structured and 
differentiated in rural areas of the developing world. The paper concludes with the importance of 
changing social relationships under a capitalist mode of production to understand the 
opportunities and constraints of disaster risk reduction, and broader adaptation strategies. 
 
Literature Review  
 
The study of vulnerability encompasses a large range of disciplines and is therefore contested 
and operationalized for different purposes. This paper is specifically focused on how 
vulnerability has been used as a framework that links coupled socioeconomic and 
environmental transformation. Typically these include both scientific knowledge and social 
science perspectives, and may be couched within geography, sustainability science, political 
ecology, or development studies. Central concepts in these discussions include sustainable 
development, resilience, vulnerability, mainstreaming adaptation into development, and 
sustainable livelihoods (WCED, 1987; Manyena, 2006; Wisner et al., 2003; Adger, 2006; Huq, 
2004; Scoones, 1998; 2009). In terms of the leading disciplinary and interdisciplinary literature, 
studies of vulnerability are highly heterogeneous in defining theoretical terms, the methods used 
and the implications for policy. This paper draws heavily on Bassett and Fogelman (2013) in 
their characterization of how interdisciplinary approaches and journals engaged with 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change simply ignore social relations as explanatory 
variables. Only three percent of articles across Global Environmental Change, Climate and 
Development, Climatic Change and Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 
identify root causes of vulnerability in social relations. The implications for this paper are stark: it 
is either contributing to a minority discourse that has no relevance to the wider climate change 
community, or it is part of a tradition that links radical theory with strongly affirming empirical 
evidence linking socioeconomic status to vulnerability, that needs to find a wider audience. This 
paper categorizes the different usages and understandings of vulnerability into three groups: 




The conventional notion of vulnerability is broadly quantitative, model reliant, mainstream 
research. (Turner et al., 2003; Kelman; Collier and Dercon, 2014; Basset and Fogelman, 2013). 
These studies generally draw upon a particular view of how human actors operate within a 
given ecosystem, identify appropriate quantitative indicators, use regression and other statistical 
methods to identify correlation and causality, and model the data to demonstrate and predict the 
rate and direction of change and possible limits, constraints and feedback loops of the system. 
 
The conventional notion of vulnerability is defined and bounded by a quantitative, positivist 
rationality for understanding vulnerability. It is perhaps best illustrated by the theoretical work of 
Hare, Kates and Warren (1977). In the natural hazard paradigm, founded by White (1945), the 
	  
60	  
second generation of scholars directly addressed these issues. Burton (1962) wrote 
enthusiastically in support of the quantitative revolution. Hare, Kates and Warren, using the 
work of economist Herbet Simon (1972), introduced a psychological understanding of human 
behavior into risk taking, arguing that human action was essentially of a satisficing rather than 
an optimizing nature. This literature incorporates ecologically derived metaphors, especially 
resilience, and models how systems produce and drive change. These models give undue 
determining force to environmental processes, not least because they are more easily 
quantifiable. They tend to emphasize historical impact and current exposure to the event, rather 
than to a changing environment-society relationship. The paradigm remains best represented by 
Burton et al. (1993). 
 
These discourses can be represented schematically as: 
V = EΔ + SΔ,  
where V=Vulnerability, E=Environmental Change and S=Socioeconomic Change.  
 
Conventional studies can easily lean on this formulation, emphasizing the environmental and 
thus leading to a form of environmental determinism. Popular presentations of climate change 
tend to revalidate such determinism, and allow criticism from climate change denialists. 
Environmental catastrophism is embraced by many seeking social transformation, and risks a 
return to the debates surrounding environmental determinism that were thought to have been 




Critical insights to conventional approaches attempt to avoid environmental determinism but do 
not necessarily capture the drivers and direction of changing social relationships. The best of 
the critical insights is associated with the livelihoods approach, where vulnerability is made up of 
numerous external sources that are categorized as shocks, trends, or seasonality (Scoones, 
1998). At best, the livelihoods approach captures a snap-shot of conditions of vulnerability but it 
is no movie: for the movie to exist, it is necessary to use Sen’s (1981) ideas on entitlements. 
Within the climate change debate, the double exposure framework identifies economic and 
environmental drivers of vulnerability, but barely articulates what is the motive force behind 
change. They fail to do this because they identify surface phenomena such as drought, difficulty 
constructing livelihoods and strategies used to cope and adapt, and give these things causal 
power. They fail to identify, or ignore, the underlying processes that are driving the generation of 
vulnerability. These processes are best highlighted through the use of a dialectical 
methodology, which captures transformation in relationships much more effectively than 
systems based theories can (Levins, 1998).  
 
Part of the problem is that, in trying to capture the social issues that underlie vulnerability, the 
focus rapidly becomes economic. Specifically, economic factors that are isolated from the social 
process which shape them. Economic definitions of vulnerability equate vulnerability with an 
absence of financial capital limiting participation in capitalist markets. The limits of these 
discourses are exemplified by the research using the double exposure framework (O’Brien and 
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Leichenko, 2008) broadly critiqued O’Keefe (2013). Adger (1999; 2006, Adger et al., 2003; 
2009) is perhaps the dominant author who defines this field although, in places, he has been 
roundly criticized (Kelman, 2008).  
 
This critical literature incorporates a range of socioeconomic and environmental processes into 
an analysis of how vulnerability and opportunities regarding climate change adaptation are 
differentiated and determined by a range of socioeconomic factors. Relevant works include 
Adger (1999; 2006), Adger et al. (2003; 2009), Eakin (2005; 2006), Eakin and Wehbe (2009), 
Conway (2011), Engle (2011), Folke (2006), Leichenko and O’Brien (2008; 2010), Mertz et al. 
(2009), Eriksen et al. (2005), Paavola (2008), Silva et al. (2010), and Sithole and Murewi (2009). 
Many examples highlighting and linking socioeconomic and environmental processes exist. This 
literature does not consider the question of how processes of societal differentiation and 
transformation will produce particular vulnerabilities to climate change alongside the varying 
capabilities to adapt (Shove, 2010). Essentially, the notions of vulnerability and development 
assume a certain predicted type of societal organization, and specifically do not accept or value 
the notion that contradictions in the socioeconomic system create specific, and differentiated, 
vulnerabilities to environmental processes. Essentially, while avoiding explicit environmental 
and economic determinism, these studies are brokered in the same discourse as conventional 
ones. Additionally, much research does not consider the power of collective social action to 
produce transformative change in our relation with the environment, and relies instead on 
ecologically derived metaphors and models to illustrate peoples relationship to the environment 
and projected societal responses to climate change (Head, 2010). 
 
These studies are valuable in their own right, but also limited. Social relations are  seen only as 
another additive that needs to be incorporated as a constituent component of vulnerability. Two 
major criticisms can be leveled here. The first is that they often imbue place-specific power 
relations and other local scale factors with too much determining capacity. Rather than scaling 
out from the household and village level to broader conditioning factors the presence of 
inequality in access and exchange of natural resources, employment opportunities and 
household vulnerability at the local scale is used to explain away structural difference and 
drivers. The second problem is that they fail to acknowledge that it is capitalism itself that 
creates and conditions both the context of vulnerability, environmental change and economic 
change but also limits and directs the range of potential responses.  
 
It is perhaps a little unfair to categorize these works as essentially tending towards an economic 
determinism, just as the conventional approaches tend towards environmental determinism. It is 
worth noting that they make huge assumptions about human agency and the drivers of 
transformation. However at root they all possess an ideology whereby collective action is simply 
an agglomeration of individual actors making rational choices. The vulnerability people 
experience is assumed to be the result of unequal exposure to a range of quantifiable, known 







These discourses can be represented schematically as:  
V = EΔ + SΔ + SRΔ,  
where V=Vulnerability, E=Environmental Change and S=Socioeconomic Change and 
SR=Social relations. 
 
This schematic is represented in the livelihoods framework by the concept of social capital, and 
in the work of Adger by the differentiation of vulnerability into individual and social/collective 
vulnerability. They choose conventional economic indicators in order to explore broad based 
social relations, of which the single most important is income opportunity. Social relations may 
be understood as social capital, political capital, formal and informal networks and institutions, 
which inform both social production and social reproduction. The difficulty in quantifying these 
social relations has not stopped people from trying, but they are restricted by an epistemology 
whereby collective action is understood as the agglomeration of individual actions. For example, 
the concept of social capital is often explored through quantifying membership of formal and 
informal groups. Questions of who gets to decide, and how, are negated.  
 
A radical approach must make social relations determinant in the final instance, and explain 
exactly how capitalism conditions and differentiates this vulnerability as it materializes in 




Defining what a radical approach might be makes it easier to judge the range of radical 
literature. The range goes from what is now termed political ecology which, within itself, has a 
large range of approaches, many of which are not radical, to studies in the political economy of 
environmental change. Vulnerability in this schema is a function of a range of socioeconomic 
processes. The key difference from the first two bodies of literature is that social relations of 
various sorts and scales are the key explanatory variables. Much political ecology research is 
concerned specifically with identifying the specific structures and processes that determine 
place specific livelihood options, but frequently without reference to the materialist base (Bassett 
and Fogelman, 2013).  The best empirical political ecology studies of long term agrarian change 
demonstrate how rural societies experience vulnerability caused precisely because of their 
relative position in the local and broader political economic context (Basset, 1988; Watts 1983; 
Berry 1993; Peters, 2007). They show that relations with a broader political economy can 
determine the differentiated exposure and vulnerability of livelihoods, and the importance of 
power relations at all scales in facilitating these processes. It is into this complex understanding 
of rural societies that efforts to understand adaptation to climate change must be placed.  
 
In this context, adaptation is usually explored through first taking the predicted impact on a 
range of sectors in a given location. This may be the impact of a change in variability or 
absolute temperature and precipitation levels on agricultural production, food security, livelihood 
diversification opportunities, or changing vulnerability amongst other processes. The connection 
between the means by which livelihoods can become less vulnerable and better adapted to 
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potential changes in precipitation and temperature are such that the relationship between 
development and adaptation is vital here. There is a rich tradition of authors in the hazards 
literature (Blaikie, 1985; Wisner et al., 2003; Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2011, O’Brien and 
O’Keefe, 2014) in seeking to establish the fundamental significance of socioeconomic relations 
in determining the production and reproduction of differentiated vulnerability in the contemporary 
rural global South. The relationship between individual livelihoods and broader socioeconomic 
processes is key (O’Keefe and Middleton, 1998; McCusker and Carr, 2008; Scoones, 2009; 
Birkenholtz, 2012). 
 
Adaptation to climate change is predicated on understanding its relation to processes of 
vulnerability generation. For now it suffices to state that climate change is predicted to represent 
a real, dynamic, threat to the ability of millions of households to sustainably construct their 
livelihoods. Those livelihoods that are already vulnerable are likely to be amongst those that are 
most vulnerable, and unable to adapt, to a highly variable and rapidly changing climate. A 
developing consensus argues that if adaptation to climate change is to be successful and 
sustainable, it should be mainstreamed into broader development policy and planning (Cannon 
and Muller-Mahn, 2011; Huq and Reid, 2004; Klein et al., 2007; O’Brien et al., 2008; Ayers and 
Dodman, 2010).  
 
A broad approach to the political economy of the environment avoids both environmental 
determinism implicit in much of the conventional literature, and the economic determinism that 
underpin most of the previously identified critiques of the conventional approach. Cannon and 
Muller-Mahn (2011) state, '…that it is pointless (or even irresponsible) to consider the risks 
resulting from climate change in isolation from…food prices, unstable markets for cash crops, 
debt or state failure' (p.625). Adaptation to climate change must be understood in the context of 
the wider political economy and the specific, material manifestations of livelihood risk and 
opportunity. The problem of adaptation is at root the problem of poverty. The problem of poverty 
cannot be disassociated from the structural causes of it (O'Brien et al., 2008; Cannon and 
Muller-Mahn, 2011). 
 
This approach can be represented schematically as: 
V = fEΔ + fSΔ + SRΔ,  
where V=Vulnerability, fE=a function of environmental change, fS=a function of socioeconomic 
change and SR=Social relationships of production, reproduction, and towards the environment. 
Environmental change and socioeconomic change are fundamentally a function of these 
relationships.  
 
In short, the issue of people and climate change is one of the production of risk in the production 
of nature (Smith and O’Keefe, 1980; Smith, 2009). The production of nature itself is regarded as 
a critical contribution of capitalism itself. Dialectically, therefore, this requires an understanding 
of how capitalism in its production of nature produces uneven opportunity of access to 







Tanzania: National and Local exploration of Vulnerability 
 
The literature review has demonstrated the validity of a radical concept of vulnerability being 
necessary to understand who is actually most vulnerable, the reasons why this is and the 
processes that drive this. It has shown the importance of understanding vulnerability as a 




Mongi et al. (2010) understand vulnerability in Tanzania explicitly as the risk of crop failure 
caused by a changed climate. The environmental basis of vulnerability in this formulation is 
overt. An external environmental event causes new vulnerabilities to emerge. A linear process 
occurs whereby the climate changes, crops become more vulnerable, therefore people become 
more vulnerable. To quote from their paper, 
 
“A vulnerability assessment of rain fed agriculture to climate change and variability in semi-arid 
parts of Tabora Region in Tanzania was conducted in 2009…Results indicate that the overall 
rainfall amount was found to decline while distribution was varying both in time and space. Inter-
seasonal dry spells between January and February appeared to increase both in duration and 
frequency. Temperature has shown an increasing trend…Major implications on rain fed 
agriculture are possible shrinking of the growing season, increasing moisture and heat stress to 
common food and cash crops, increased insects and pests and eventually low income and food 
insecurity. This study concludes that there is strong evidence demonstrating the vulnerability of 
rain fed agriculture to negative impacts of climate change and variability in the study area 
(p.371)”. 
 
Agrawala et al. (2003) provide another example of the conventional understanding of 
vulnerability, relating to both climate change and the case study area. It is broadly emblematic 
of a range of global studies seeking to quantify the impacts of climate change on agricultural 
productivity, and the subsequent consequences for livelihoods. These studies seek to quantify 
precisely how much of a threat climate change is to agriculture, which de facto makes 
livelihoods more vulnerable. It is difficult to escape the determining power of the natural 
environment in these formulations. Mendelsohn et al. (1994, 2007) are at the forefront of these 
efforts globally, and they remain highly influential. If we are to commit investment towards 
reducing the predicted impacts of climate change, then it is of course necessary to explore what 
changes may occur. However, framing these issues as being driven ultimately by the vagaries 
of the climate misses the complex of factors such as local, national or international 
marginalization of people, trends in commodity production, government support for agriculture, 





The overwhelming problem with these approaches, is that change in livelihoods and 
vulnerability is driven by a changing environment. The social relations that determine 
vulnerability in the first and last instance are barely mentioned. It may be highly appropriate 
science for exploring the relationship between crop yields and environmental factors and 
change, but it is rather weak social science when it comes to explaining the very existence of 





In seeking to avoid environmentally determinist explanations of vulnerability, other authors have 
specifically addressed social issues.  
 
Christiaensen and Sarris (2007) approach the concept of vulnerability from a strictly economic 
perspective, “…the likelihood of being poor in the future” (p.1). This is an important corrective to 
previously discussed work, as it focuses both the sources and the impact of vulnerability strictly 
in the realm of socioeconomic relations, but it also recapitulates some questionable 
assumptions.  The first point to make is that this paper explicitly repeats the tautology that 
Middleton and O’Keefe (1998) allege is present in Blaikie et al. (1994): vulnerability simply 
becomes synonymous with poverty. The poorer you are, the more vulnerable you are, and vice 
versa. This evidently has a factual basis, as the poor on average are much more likely to be 
vulnerable. However, the processes by which this vulnerability manifests is not simply that lack 
of capital equals vulnerability. It highlights the close linkages between socioeconomic position 
and broader vulnerability, but provides no explanation as to why these processes occur.  
 
The paper does highlight the coupled nature of vulnerability coming from exposure to both 
commodity price fluctuations as well as rainfall variability, which is important, but it places the 
question of vulnerability in the future. The linking of vulnerability with future, expected poverty, 
completely missed the means by which structural and historical events hugely determine both 
contemporary and future vulnerability. It may be ironic (to some) to have an argument couched 
in Marxist ideas to accuse other authors of economic determinism, but following Harvey (2009) 
the claim is made that neither Marx nor Marxism need be economically determinist. 
 
There have been a wide range of studies seeking to explore more critically  the relationship 
between livelihoods, vulnerability, exposure to environmental hazards and options for coping 
and adaptation. Two approaches are sympathetically critiqued here, which are the double 
exposure framework and the livelihoods approach. Both have been used to highlight the 
‘coupled’ aspects of socioeconomic and environmental sources of vulnerability (double 
exposure), and vulnerability and livelihoods (Livelihoods approach). 
 
Holler (2014), in his work of the Kilimanjaro Region, defines vulnerability specifically as “[the] 
susceptibility to be harmed by a hazard” (p.527). This draws heavily on the dominant view of 
vulnerability represented by Adger, O’Brien, Leichenko, and Paavola amongst others. This view 
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holds that vulnerability is the combination of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity 
(Paavola, 2008). This is scaled from the individual to the social to frame the Holler (2014) study.  
 
The key findings from the Holler study are that those who can take advantage of measures to 
increase adaptive capacity tend already to be relatively less vulnerable than others, and 
consequently adaptation measures already undertaken on Kilimanjaro are reproducing, rather 
than reducing social vulnerability. Regarding vulnerability specifically, he identifies “at least” four 
processes driving it on Mt. Kilimanjaro: “climate change, land and forest degradation, economic 
change…and population increase”. Importantly, the sources of vulnerability are coupled, but 
there is no indication of the mechanisms by which these processes structure and differentiate 
livelihood vulnerability. 
 
The livelihoods framework (Scoones 1998; Scoones, 2009) defines vulnerability as a 
combination of both economic and environmental forces that make livelihoods more vulnerable. 
They are classified as being shocks, trends, or seasonality. Chapter three of this dissertation 
used this framework to explore vulnerability on Mt. Kilimanjaro. Using the framework along with 
evidence from the field, major shocks were identified as being health events and drought 
(matching the findings of Christiaensen and Sarris (2007)), major trends were associated with a 
shift in household food production towards maize (from bananas, cf. Maghimbi, 2007) and 
fluctuating commodity prices (especially coffee), and significant seasonal variation in 
precipitation, household expenditure requirements and opportunities for income generating 
activities. The argument made here is not that these processes are not indicative of 
vulnerability, rather that they identify the source of vulnerability as completely external to the 
social relations that enable, mediate and restrict access to the different capital assets of the 
livelihoods framework.  
 
To expand, the heart of this critique lies in this externalization, and partial naturalization of the 
sources of vulnerability. Drought is probably the most serious natural hazard that affects the 
livelihoods of people in Kilimanjaro Region.  Seventy two per cent of respondents stated that 
drought had a great impact on their agricultural productivity, fifty nine per cent claimed that it 
had a great impact on their health and thirty two per cent perceived it as having a great impact 
on availability of energy sources. When asked to identify the last time a drought affected the 
area they reside in, a wide variation of years was recorded, indicating that the effects can be 
very localized; following Wijkman and Timberlake (1984), drought may simply be an instance of 
not been able to access enough water to sustain a particular livelihood option. This was 
especially true in the more arid parts of the case study area, where drought was simply not an 
issue for 22 per cent of households that were able to access piped water. Of course, drought is 
a climatic process, but the ability of people to adapt and cope with its effects is a function of 
existing social relations that have permitted some households to access adaptive measures, but 
prohibit their widespread adoption.  
 
These examples are not intended to belittle the value of research carried out by (often African) 
physical scientists and social scientists. Indeed, some of the same authors are engaged in work 
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that can be placed in both the conventional and the conventional critique categories, showing 
reflexive dynamism in trying to understand the ‘wicked problem’ of climate change. 
 
  
Radical Approaches  
 
Wangui et al. (2012), in a political ecology study, do not specifically engage with vulnerability in 
Kilimanjaro region, but explore many of the same this issues that this paper engages with: 
livelihoods, climate change, coping with environmental stress and capacity of people to adapt. 
Even though vulnerability is a hugely important component of many of the authors’ works 
(Wisner et al., 2003; Smucker and Wisner, 2007; Mascarenhas, 2010), it is curiously absent in 
this paper. Although it is neither environmentally or economically deterministic, the factors that 
shape vulnerability, which fundamentally underpin differentiated risk in Kilimanjaro Region, are 
barely mentioned. Rather they place the process of adaptation itself at the center of livelihood 
diversification as a response to vulnerability (p.13). 
 
Mascarenhas (2010), part of the group that produced the Wangui et al. (2012) paper, perhaps 
comes closest to defining, specifically in this region, what this paper is exploring. He asks, “How 
significant is climate change in understanding vulnerability and resilience…among farmers in 
Kilimanjaro Region - Tanzania?…with or without climate change, the vulnerability and resilience 
is more dependent on socio-economic alignments rather than on physical factors alone” (p.4). 
This next section will attempt to elucidate this version of understanding both vulnerability and its 
determining constituents. 
 
One radical approach to understanding the relationship between climate change and livelihoods 
is to focus on the role of the state in defining the drivers of vulnerability, along with the 
prescription for increasing resilience. In another paper by the same group as Wangui et al. 
(2102), Smucker et al. (2015) identify the roots of naturalized discourses regarding the 
understanding of climate change and vulnerability as emanating top-down from government and 
technocratic formulations. These are then recapitulated by farmers, who as yet do not seem to 
have universal knowledge of the institutional (Kiswahili) definition, even when accounting for 
their intimate knowledge of their immediate environment (Wisner et al., 2012).  
 
This rejection of the state as an agent with the interests of rural livelihoods as an object of 
development derives heavily from Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998). It raises the question of 
what exactly is being made less vulnerable or more resilient: the livelihoods of people or the 
institutions of government (O’Brien, 2005; Wisner et al., 2012; Smucker et al., 2015). In the case 
study area the role of the government and associated technical knowledge in defining the 
language of climate change becomes critical and determining. The failure to differentiate rural 
livelihoods in the face of a monolithic climate threat both naturalizes the sources of vulnerability 
and removes local capacity to interpret and adapt to change. Moreover, many proposed 
adaptations to climate change are likely to reinforce existing forms of social relations and 




This is an important insight but it leads to a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to that 
which most radical approaches to vulnerability reach. Smucker et al. (2015) argue that linking 
state driven development with undifferentiated adaptation policies, “[cast] doubt on the 
presumed benefits of integrating adaptation into development policy” (p.48). This is an unusual 
conclusion for a radical approach for two reasons. First, it argues that adaptation has already 
been mainstreamed into existing development policy, something that other scholars have 
argued must be done in order to reduce vulnerability (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2011). Second, 
the argument appears to be made that adaptation ought to be disassociated from existing 
development practices if it is to succeed, as successful adaptation is an inherently local 
process. Essentially, a rejection of the state, rather than capturing the state for development 
purposes is the goal. 
 
Vulnerability, political economy, scale and climate change on Kilimanjaro 
   
Coulson (2014), restates the need for political economy along with history to understand 
changing social relations. These debates are not over even if they are not being made at the 
present moment. O’Keefe (2015) attempts to do this using primary and secondary sources. He 
argues that vulnerability is intimately tied to the relationship between households, the specific 
historical and environmental context and the wider socioeconomic processes that structure and 
differentiate it. Which people are most vulnerable, and consequently have least capacity to 
adapt? O’Keefe (2015), along with others (O’Keefe, 2013, O’Brien et al., 2008) has 
demonstrated that vulnerability is perceived and experienced by households in a range of ways: 
as heightened exposure to the impacts of drought, as an inability to adequately provide food for 
all household members, (increased) reliance on sufficient rainfall to sustain livelihoods, and lack 
of financial capital. 
 
One example of a structural shift, rooted in both socioeconomic and sociocultural processes, is 
a dietary one. The transformation from bananas to maize as the staple carbohydrate on Mt. 
Kilimanjaro has occurred in the past thirty years (Maghimbi, 2007). The effect of this is most 
pronounced on the mountain where the coffee and banana groves have existed for most of the 
last century. This is important because it is almost impossible to achieve high levels of efficiency 
with a crop like maize in small plots like that found on the upper slopes of Kilimanjaro where 
household kihambas (homegardens) are found.  
 
Overall, average food security on Mt. Kilimanjaro is fairly high. However, pockets of deprivation 
exist, and historically this has been unusual as Kilimanjaro region has been one of the relatively 
richest regions but has had a disproportionately high level of malnutrition (Howard and Millard, 
1997). The reason for this unexpectedly high level of food is suggested to be a consequence of 
changing social relations on the mountain through the twentieth century. Previously dominant 
clan obligations, and redistributive cultural practices reduced the increasing inequality in a 
society that was gradually becoming incorporated into the global capitalist system. This 
development of capitalist relations, and the consequent rural differentiation that occurred, that 
has led to the presence of higher than expected levels of malnutrition.  
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It has had effects on household vulnerability in a range of ways, most noticeably in reducing 
options for generating income through the sale of export orientated agricultural crops, rather 
than maize production for household or local consumption. 
 
The most typical historical pattern of transformation in rural areas articulated to the capitalist 
mode of production is that of differentiation. Small-scale farmers, of which 85% of households in 
the area, are an analytical category that hide as much as they describe. It has been known for a 
long time that agricultural self-sufficiency in rural households is rarely achieved, or even desired 
(Bryceson, 2000) - ostensibly ‘farming’ households, both in the literature and in O’Keefe (2015) 
are compelled out of necessity to seek out a range of income generating strategies. 
Diversification of household livelihood strategies is on its own, not particularly novel. O’Keefe 
(2015) presents results comparable with those of Mueller (2011): of the 206 households 
surveyed, only 5% stated that it was possible for the household to meet all its food requirements 
without working outside the farm. This indicates that across all wealth categories household 
members are required to engage to some form of off-farm income.  
 
What follows is a ‘cameo’ of the characteristics of ‘typical’ vulnerable households on Mt. 
Kilimanjaro. It is based upon observations from the fieldwork of those households that struggle 
most with producing and reproducing their livelihoods.  
 
On Kilimanjaro, vulnerable households are not landless in the literal sense. Most have at least a 
very small amount of land accessible, and many have a degree of land tenure security. 
However, they lack the ability to access credit for investing in agriculture, and are unable to 
access more land close to existing plots: their place based social networks have been eroded 
and they haven’t been able to take advantage of new technologies (particularly cell phones). 
Previously communal access to resources has been restricted or made prohibitively expensive 
(water, firewood/charcoal), and are not able to grow enough for subsistence or a surplus to sell 
to secure their livelihood. These households also tended not to receive significant remittances 
from outside the area. They are unable to invest in novel agricultural techniques for 
intensification, usually through a combination of not having access to education or sources of 
expert information, and not being able to mobilize the resources, labor power and technological 
inputs as successfully as other households. Consequently, they are liable to be missed in 
development interventions and projects that are increasingly results driven and small-scale 
farmer focused, as it is easier to achieve transformation by focusing on those who have the 
capacity to change. 
 
An important counter to this are the households that are not vulnerable to the same degree. 
Many of the least vulnerable households observed in the fieldwork based their security primarily 
on secure, waged employment (teachers, government workers), remittances from relatives or 
other off-farm sources of income. A significant proportion of the ways by which rural livelihoods 
are secured are derived from relations with external sources. This is also indicative of how 
social capital has transformed as networks and relationships are increasingly less place 
dependent and defined. Following Holler's (2014), these people are the group most likely to take 
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advantage of adaptive measures to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and other 
threats to livelihoods.  
 
Understanding vulnerability as a process necessarily involves assumptions about what drives 
changing livelihood vulnerability. Conventional approaches, the critique of these approaches 
and the radical version of vulnerability presented in this article all contain some motive force 
driving socioecological change.  
 
First, the idea of transformation is found in certain studies that attempt to quantify the impact of 
climate change on agricultural production and the consequent implications for food security 
(Mendohlson et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2014). Inherent in this position is the assumption that 
changes in precipitation and temperature trends and extremes drive and determine yields, 
which in turn threaten the ability of people to command satisfactory food resources. The 
assumption that local food production is determinant in how the vulnerable rural poor access 
food is an ideological as much as evidence based position. It is not novel to point out that how 
people access food, and how this access is structured and differentiated, and the ability of 
individuals and groups to demand food security as an entitlement, are usually significantly more 
important in reducing both individual and collective vulnerability to the threat of hunger. 
 
Second, a contemporary mainstream development economics perspective on rural 
transformation. McMillan and Heady (2014) show how economic understanding of rural 
development is predicated on (labor) productivity in both agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors, quantified as the value of goods and services produced for exchange, with increased 
productivity both the mechanism and the target goal. Development in this paradigm is 
increased, measurable economic growth, and effort is directed towards transforming the 
institutions and structures that enable and regulate this activity. Vulnerability is just what 
happens if people remain poor. 
 
A focus on the question of scale highlights the contradictions inherent in reconciling different 
ideas of both socioeconomic and environmental vulnerability. Smith (1992) pointed out that 
scales were frequently jumped, and households in Kilimanjaro face ‘jumped scales’ not simply in 
the social world but in the physical world as well. Critical approaches to understanding 
vulnerability enable these issues to be placed in relation to each other. Broadly, the argument 
being made here is that biophysical framings of climate change impacts have not successfully 
scaled down, and that much adaptation to climate change research has not scaled up 
sufficiently. This expands on criticism made by Head (2010), Shove (2012) and Mascharenas 
(2000). 
  
The question of scale bedevils the issue of climate change. Climatological, physiographic and 
coupled human-natural systems research tends to begin with the global scale (Mendelsohn et 
al, 2007; Turner et al., 2003; IPCC 2001, 2007, 2014). The problems with this are best 
highlighted by the difficulty in scaling down these models into making accurate predictions 
regarding the specific temperature and precipitation changes, and consequently the impacts on 
livelihood production and reproduction.  Ahmed et al. (2011) highlight this difficulty in identifying 
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predicted climate change impacts on Tanzania. Broad trends in temperature increases are 
expected, but precipitation trends remain unclear, as does the expected change in climatic 
variability. On Mt. Kilimanjaro, high variation of precipitation and temperature occurs over a 
relatively small spatial area, based upon altitude, aspect, and various other micro factors (Bart 
et al., 2006).  
 
This discussion begins from the household scale. As with much political ecology type research, 
household surveys, in depth interviews and other mixed methods contributed to an extensive 
knowledge base regarding local livelihood strategies and landuse practices. It also begins from 
the household scale because this paper at its core is an exploration of the viability and options 
for social reproduction of rural livelihoods. At the household scale availability and potential to 
commodity (often male) labor, female ownership rights of land, and household usufruct access 
to common resources determine livelihood strategies and contribute to differentiated 
vulnerability (O’Keefe, 2013).  
 
At community level there has been a collapse of traditional communal and customary coping 
and adaptations to land ownership, increasingly privatized, to water availability, increasingly 
scarce for some, to agricultural inputs, which are now market based, and to the collapse of 
producer coop organizations, especially coffee.  
 
The next scale is local. At this scale it is apparent that the issues of local government 
commitment supported strongly by the top-down party framework leads to a successful defense 
against famine conditions, but leaves aside questions about the ongoing existence of chronic 
malnutrition and hunger. The causes of these issues are multi-scalar, increasing inequality and 
continued malnutrition in a relatively wealthy part of Tanzania. 
 
At regional level, there is the first appearance of hard physiographic data, especially on climate. 
However, it is not sufficiently disaggregated to allow community level knowledge, diagnosis and 
prescription regarding reducing vulnerability and options for adaptation. For example, while 
extremes appear to be increasing (particularly temperature), there is still a paucity of accurate 
historical climatological data, it is unclear if contemporary trends will continue at the same rate 
(Mwandosya et al., 2003; O’Keefe, 2007; Ahmed et al. 2011). 
 
The regional level also contains a substantial change in pastoralism. Although Kilimanjaro 
Region is dominated symbolically by Kibo peak, the foothills and plains of the region have been 
an important area for the Maasai and other pastoralist groups. The relative demise of 
pastoralism and thus the reduction in exchange between the Chagga agriculturalists and 
pastoralists has coincided with the consolidation of dryland areas that form the 'shambas' 
(second farms originally assigned through customary means on the basis of need). These 
ownership patterns are based in part on a failed Ujamaa policy, and more recently with the drive 
to achieve agricultural modernization (URT, 2010). My research suggested approximately 50% 
of households surveyed do not have access to ‘shamba’ land. This, most importantly and 




The national level is driven by agricultural modernization of dryland areas, thus precluding   
many Chagga from agricultural expansion. Driven by global emphasis on the need for 
agricultural development and modernization (World Bank, 2008), with small-scale farmers 
central to achieving this goal, Tanzania has attempted to intensify agriculture and increase its 
profitability. Unfortunately, it seems to be doing this by letting lands out to national and 
international capital at the expense of its own farmers (Coulson, 2014). 
 
The agrarian question of how these rural areas will differentiate as modernization occurs is 
incredibly pertinent here, yet missing from just about every study of climate change impacts. 
Also, at a national level, critical off-farm income opportunities are often provided by government 
services throughout the nation, or found in the largest city, Dar es Salaam (and Arusha). These 
are some of the few livelihood strategies that are closely associated with less vulnerable 
households, and indicate again the importance of understanding the root causes of (reducing) 
vulnerability across scales.  
 
At international level, the vagaries of commodity prices, both exports (coffee and other export 
crops, also natural gas) and imports (specifically oil and agricultural technology), the limited in-
country capital accumulation, and the non-generation of a domestic middle class with enough 
purchasing power to drive an accumulation strategy, limit contemporary options for development 
and investment. Marginalized in both the spheres of production and circulation of global 
commodity chains, somewhat ironically Tanzania is likely to depend on international and 
bilateral agreements in order to unlock the capital necessary to achieve a reduction in 
vulnerability and sustainable adaptation options.  
 
This is a broad political economy of scale. How does this relate to vulnerability? First, is that 
vulnerabilities are generated beyond the control of individual farming households. Secondly, it 
means that in Kilimanjaro Region in the 21st Century there is an expansion of the geography of 
dispossession through land lease to national and international companies and capital (Shivji, 
2009). Thirdly it means that an increasing proportion of the Kilimanjaro population will become 
increasingly marginalized, first used a device by Susman et al. (1983). Not least because, of 
deproletarianization through decreasing formal sector opportunity (Brass, 2004; 2011b). The 
whole debate needs to be linked to the debate on poverty alleviation, in much the same way 
that the debate on disaster risk reduction needs to be related the debate on accelerated climate 
change, especially extremes (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2011; Wisner, 2015).  
 
In trying to hold these contradictory, dynamic and multi-scalar relations in a coherent framework 
it is useful to return to Harvey (1996; 2009; 2014), and also the arguments of Brass (2011a; 
2011b). Marginalization means minimal proletarianization is occurring in the region, and without 
proletarianization there is no basis to obtain from capital what is needed to achieve social 
reproduction (Brass, 2011b). Vulnerability and marginalization are meso-level concepts and 
illuminate the range of causes that threaten the viability of household production and social 
reproduction. However, they must be nested within the macro-level of capitalist accumulation, 




Focusing on the changing social relationships that alter vulnerability enables two things. First, to 
question whether mainstream approaches to achieving ‘climate proofed’ sustainable 
development are successful, if they fail to reduce vulnerability of the most precarious. Secondly, 
it demonstrates that this uneven development and differentiated vulnerability is fundamental to 
the production and reproduction of specific social formations under capitalism. Exploring the 
impacts, and especially predicting future trends, of environmental processes on social 
development is hugely complicated by this unevenness, particularly when observing village, 
household or individual scales. Almost no climate models for sub-Saharan Africa operate on a 
resolution finer than 25km x 25km (Wangui et al., 2012). In the Kilimanjaro Region this 
geographical space hides vast socioeconomic and environmental variation, therefore modeling 
alone fetishizes the significant different ion between households, sub-villages and villages. The 
ability of households to produce secure livelihoods, and to cope with and adapt to existing 
climatic variability is highly variable, over a small geographical area, and the roots of this 





This paper has argued that social relations must be central to any analysis of coupled social-
natural processes, and concurrently for the importance of the specific geographical and 
historical that also codetermine the material reality in which livelihoods are produced and 
reproduced. These same processes are also those that drive the differentiation of vulnerability 
and resilience. It validates the arguments made by Tschakert et al., (2013) regarding the 
importance of understanding structural causes of vulnerability, and supports Holler’s (2014) 
cautionary tale of how the least vulnerable tend to be those benefitting from existing adaptation 
measures in Kilimanjaro region. 
 
It is difficult to talk of the coproduction of environment and society unless social relations of 
production and reproduction are predominant. The literature review and the case material 
showed that for the conventional there was an inclination for environment to dominate and 
therefore no examination of the coproduction of environment. For the critique of the 
conventional, there was a tendency for the economic to dominate, and attempts to capture the 
social dynamic were essentially simplistic and superficial. The difficulty of having a radical 
approach requires a dialectic that covers the production of nature, the production of uneven 
development and understanding of place an culture and most importantly an understanding of 
the various scale factors that impact local livelihoods. In this essay there has been an attempt to 
address these factors, but any sense of failure is not a sense of failure but the hope of a better 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that it is the change in social relations of production and 
reproduction, driven by changes in capitalism and climate change on Mount Kilimanjaro, that 
are at the root of differentiated household vulnerability. This vulnerability manifests itself as an 
inability to cope with drought, an inability to commodify labor and an inability to access the 
necessary options for social reproduction.  
For most households, vulnerability materializes as an inability to access adequate food security. 
Although hunger does not affect every household, it remains the principal reason for defining a 
“bad year” for the majority of them. Entitlements, whether customary or state provided, are 
generally weaker than in the past.  
Climate change enters this mix as a 'wicked problem' (Lazarus, 2009) - inextricably related to 
existing processes. This dissertation has demonstrated that there is no compelling evidence 
why it will necessarily become the determining factor in the viability of rural livelihoods and the 
generation of differentiated vulnerability in the case study area. How, then should reducing 
vulnerability, increasing resilience, and identifying appropriate climate change adaptation 
responses proceed. There is broad agreement amongst social scientists that climate change 
adaptation needs to be mainstreamed into development (Ayers and Dodman, 2010). There is 
increasing recognition that vulnerability reduction/increasing resilience that is not truly 
transformative is simply, at best, coping within the existing status quo (Smucker et al., 2015). In 
their discussion of vulnerability in another part of Kilimanjaro Region, Smucker et al. (2015) 
propose the notion of transformative resilience. This dissertation’s findings strongly support this 
idea, but with one major caveat. Smucker et al. (2015) essentially reject the state as the agent 
of development: the argument made here is that it is the principal, if not the only actor with the 
capacity to engender development and hence vulnerability reduction in the case study area.  
So what then of the most vulnerable? What are the steps that should be taken to reduce the 
vulnerability of these households? The nationally supported answer to reducing poverty in rural 
areas of Tanzania, and consequently in theory reducing vulnerability, is to increase the 
profitability of agriculture. However, it is already apparent that those who are able to benefit from 
this are not generally those already on the mountain who engage primarily in agriculture. 
Rather, it is locals who are able to draw on capital reserves obtained through off-farm income, 
or external flows of capital coming in.  
This dissertation argues for a radical notion of vulnerability as the necessary way forward if the 
most vulnerable to climate change are to have the greatest chance of adapting. This is 
particularly important at this current point as the IPCC WG2 has acknowledged the importance 
of social relations in understanding vulnerability (Tschakert, 2013) and is continually working to 
incorporate these ideas into its Assessment Reports. Therefore this dissertation contributes to 
this idea. It does so, however, by showing that a narrow focus on climate change, its impacts 
and the options for adaptation is actually an ineffective way for reducing the vulnerability that 
makes households more susceptible to future climate change. It has also shown the limitations 
of livelihoods, resilience, adaptive capacity and narrow economically or environmentally 
deterministic versions of vulnerability.  
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Smith (2009) in his foreword to the 3rd edition of Uneven Development wrote that a genuine 
dialectical critique of climate change was necessary and not yet forthcoming. There are many 
reasons in which this has not materialized as of yet: the catastrophism of some climate change 
campaigners (Swyngedouw, 2013), the fear of being associated with oil-industry funded 
astroturfers and climate change deniers prominent amongst them. However, there is genuinely 
a case that climate change adaptation research has become a black box into which research 
funding and intellectual decisions are framed around.  
Climate change is held by many to be as transformative and determining as capitalist relations 
of production, reproduction and towards the environment are. This research has shown that this 
is not the case: it is the production and reproduction of daily life in which both vulnerability is 
generated and various risks manifest themselves. Marginal increases or decrease in crop 
yields, which is the principal pathway by which climate change. The evidence from the 
household level in Tanzania in this dissertation indicates that there is no reason to assume this 
is the case. Rather, it is in precisely the struggles to achieve control over production and 
reproduction of everyday life that vulnerability is both generated and experienced.  
Historically, the biggest transformations in the systems of social production and reproduction on 
Mt. Kilimanjaro have occurred as a consequence of exposure and integration into colonial and 
capitalist relations. The Chagga identity was forged out of different clans on the mountain that 
spoke, in places, mutually unintelligible languages. This process was driven as much by top-
down colonial rule that sought to have an identifiable group in the area, with a hierarchy and 
leaders who could control the population as much as immanent coming together of those on the 
mountain (Bart et al., 2006; Shivji, 2009).  
A dialectical approach to climate change and vulnerability must rescale from the concrete and 
empirical to the abstract. This discussion concludes with an attempt to do this, relating 
processes of vulnerability generation and climate change to other structural drivers of 
transformation, and macro-level theories of change.  
The question of scale  
Scale is fundamental to geography and understanding the relationship between global 
processes and local manifestations. Unfortunately, much recent work on the question has 
rejected the idea of scale as incorrigibly hierarchal. This dissertation has led me to believe that 
the question of scale must be central to discussions of vulnerability, livelihoods and adaptation 
to predicted climate change.  
Based on my experience during fieldwork in Tanzania, it has increasingly being clear that a 
variety of scales, partially but not deterministically hierarchal, impact on the construction of 
livelihoods and the generation of differentiated vulnerability on Mt. Kilimanjaro. One example is 
perhaps enough to highlight the importance of scale when trying to simultaneously explore 
processes of environmental and socioeconomic change on the mountain. The principal basis for 
predictions regarding future climate change are General Circulation Models. Global and regional 
modeling has been developed to generate scenarios of future climate change that can then be 
compared against existing and past climate and past coping mechanisms to determine how 
people might adapt or may be forced to react should dramatic climate changes become 
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manifest at local scales. These predictions are often made on a regional scale, missing huge 
degrees of livelihood differentiation. The highest resolution of these models tends to be no 
smaller than 25x25km, which simply cannot capture the diversity of environmental and 
socioeconomic variation in a location like Kilimanjaro.  
Scale and Kilimanjaro  
The key question that has emerged from this dissertation is how is scale experienced at 
household level? Specifically, how do global processes of commodity exchange, climate 
change, attempts to achieve agricultural modernization and dominant discourses of 
development trajectories materialize in the lived experience of households? Whilst not an 
exhaustive list, these processes are highly indicative of how households are acted upon by a 
range of scales.  
The highly variable global price of commodities, in this case study coffee, is a significant source 
of risk for households. The risks can be moderated somewhat by strong local institutions that 
are able to guarantee quality of product, and hence its likelihood of finding a buyer. Survey 
respondents talked about removing coffee trees from their gardens, or ceasing to maintain the 
bushes, due to it not being economic. It was usually replaced with the planting of maize, which 
at least offers the potential of both use value and exchange value. These findings tally with 
Maghimbi (2007), who noted a broad shift in the homegardens of Kilimanjaro from coffee to 
maize.  
Coffee therefore highlights the importance of scale in studies of livelihood vulnerability in two 
key ways. When coffee was the major source of accumulation on Kilimanjaro, its success was 
largely based on households scaling up and forming the KNCU, a producers union. Prevailing 
conditions in the 1930s even enabled an expansion of coffee farming in parallel with a globally 
depressed price, due to comparative advantage of producing on Kilimanjaro. The strength of the 
union also enabled local people to take advantage of educational and commercial opportunities, 
becoming disproportionately influential in the newly independent Tanganyika.  Opportunities to 
jump scales are much more limited now, due to a weakened union, relatively little support for 
agricultural activities as well as the geographical limits to expanding coffee production on the 
mountain.  
Climate change is therefore a science that cannot predict accurate impacts on production 
systems at the local scale, and tends to homogenize the huge levels of rural variability under the 
assumption that most households will be affected by difficulty growing certain crops. And 
further, that these crops are primarily picked for cultivation on the basis of exclusively climatic 
factors. This dissertation has indicated that this is not the case.  
Scale, livelihoods and vulnerability  
What nobody is talking about is the daily lived experience of social production and reproduction. 
This is where vulnerability is generated, vulnerability that is dependent primarily on access to 
these means of social production and reproduction.  
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Currently we are, to an extent, jumping on climate change to both explain and provide a 
mechanism to respond to crisis. What I have shown is that when we look across scale these 
processes show the relationship back to issues of class, scale and other known processes. We 
don’t know if people respond to climate change or weather variability. We’ve jumped on climate 
change as a means to force (or reject) the state to address uneven development.  
This dissertation has argued that differentiated household vulnerability is driven by social 
relations. Differentiated access to land, to secure employment and other strategies to Climate 
change as one potential multi-scale hazard amongst many. Evidence from this research 
suggests that it is the processes of social production and reproduction that create a greater risk, 
and therefore vulnerability, than that of climate change.  
This research began with the notion that environmental and socioeconomic processes were, all 
things being equal, capable of generating vulnerability towards households. What this 
Tanzanian example shows is that it is in fact social relations that dominate this coproduction. 
Secondly, the key question of the coproduction of nature is whether capitalism is produced in 
such a way that the environment becomes in crisis because of capitalism, or the environment 
becomes in crisis through lack of capitalism. Agreeing with Shivji (2009), it is the lack of 
capitalism, specifically the inability to commodify labor at a rate that enables social reproduction, 
allows non-productive social relationships to dominate the Chagga on Kilimanjaro. Bringing 
Harvey’s (2009) framework back in, on the six moments of transition there is incomplete 
transformation. However, although there are many relics of pre-capitalist social formations in the 
case study area, the logic of production for surplus value dominates the region overall. If 
capitalist relations were able to be fully established, it would in theory enable many more 
households to sell their labor or surplus product (not surplus value) to the regional and world 
economy.  
Using the dialectic, which is frequently seen as being forcefully about purpose, not about 
projection, leads me in this case study to say there can be a residual to capitalism which is 
largely without purpose in the contemporary round of accumulation. In other words, it is the 
opposite of Smith’s argument on gentrification – that there was a purposeful capitalist 
accumulation process. The problem here is that there is none. The dialectic can illustrate 
results, but can also highlight non-results – this in a sense is a non-result – it is the failure of 
capitalist relations to fully establish themselves.  
This relationship between capitalist transformation, vulnerability and livelihoods is particularly 
important regarding measures to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and options to adapt 
to climate change. Fundamentally, most proposed adaptation measures (especially relevant to 
this case study is Holler’s (2014) identification of potential adaptive options) are in essence 
‘sticking plaster’, ways of attempting to maintain the existing livelihood strategies and social 
formations in the context of a changing world. New varieties of cops, efficient stoves and other 
localized measures don’t contain any transformative potential within them, and Holler (2014) 
also notes that even these measures tend to be most available to the better connected, less 
vulnerable households. If there was a form of capitalism that provided vulnerable households 
with an opportunity to access employment or more profitable agriculture we would be looking for 
completely new adaptation mechanisms.  
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Many academic arguments are in the past tense, or preserve contemporary conditions in aspic - 
they are about a social formation and a pre-capitalist mode of production that no longer exists. 
Although we can’t be certain of the future tense (dialectically), the defense of only the past tense 
is a poor argument to defend the people. This dissertation is not predictive, however it has 
explored the relations of existing conditions and teases out feasible possibilities of future 
options. It is not the environmental contradictions that drive forward and determine future 
society, it is only by understanding social relations that can give us a grasp on the future tense.  
I believe I have materialized coproduction of nature but in this realization I have sensed that 
social relations are more important that physical/natural-social relations. I have also sensed that 
in terms of climate change, with the melting icecaps of Kilimanjaro as an iconic reference, that 
climate change is relatively unimportant in the transformation of the local livelihood system. 
Much of the argument is too big and beyond, Kilimanjaro, Tanzania and Africa to quite capture. 
Central to vulnerability and livelihoods are the relations of capital to property, especially land. 
Under colonial rule, communal land was allowed but the state became the ultimate proprietor. 
For Tanzania's future, as a nation state, it means that it has control of land leasing and sales. 
Currently international markets and institutions look as if they will direct the Tanzanian state to 
large scale land sales to finance its future. There are many voices against that (Shivji, 2009), or 
bemoaning that (Wisner, 2015). There are not many voices that speak for the people. This 
dissertation has argued that vulnerability will be reduced when adaptation occurs because of 
development, as opposed to others who are broadly trying to keep the old social formation alive. 
Quite simply adaptive capacity increases through development. Adaptation shouldn't be 
mainstreamed, it should be subsumed. Because in the absence of development, vulnerable 
households have virtually no adaptive capacity. Focusing on “bouncebackability” or 
“bounceforwardability”, i.e. focusing on vulnerability or resilience is missing the point. From the 
perspective of the most vulnerable households, perhaps they don't go forwards, backwards, 
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